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ABSTRACT 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNMENT SIZE: ADOPTING THE MEAN GROUP 
ESTIMATOR MODEL 
By 
Oscar Caster Katumba 
 
                   Conventional pooled estimators such as fixed and random effects models posit 
parameter homogeneity across countries, but this study employed the Mean Group Estimator 
Model (Pesaran and Smith 1995), which considers parameter heterogeneity to analyze the 
average effect of globalization, including the impact of its primary constituents such as trade 
liberalization and financial openness, on the size of government in a sample of 25 countries 
between the period 1973 and 2005.  While overall globalization`s average effect was 
insignificant, it assumed strong negative and positive significance at country level.   
                 Conversely, both trade openness and international capital flows were negatively 
and significantly related to government size, rendering credence to the efficiency hypothesis 
(Liberati 2007), albeit related positive and significant country coefficients also existed. By 
and large, the study shows that different levels of openness, coupled with different political, 
economic, and social structures across countries, all serve to uniquely determine the size of 
government. The latter disparity in openness and structures, may also plausibly explain how 
governments may act to maximize globalization`s benefits, and also ward off its negative 
effects. Precisely, this study affirms the import of country heterogeneity, in understanding 
globalization`s effect on government size, akin to an 8-country study done by Islam (2004). 
  
 
 
요약 
 
글로벌와와 정부 규모: 평균 추정 모델 이용 
 
저자: 오스카 캐스터 카툼바 
 
본 연구는 고정 및 무작위 영향 모델과 같은 변수 동질성을 가정한 통합 추정 
모델과 달리 평균 추정 모델을 Mean Group Estimator Model (Pesaran and Smith 1995) 
사용한다. 여기서 평균 추정 모델은 국가들의 변수 비동질성를 고려하여 글로벌 
영향을 분석하며, 무역 자유화, 금융 개방 등을 고려하여 1973 년부터 
2005 년까지 25 개국의 정부 규모에 대해 분석하였다. 전체 글로벌화의 평균 
영향은 미미한 것으로 나타났으나 본 연구는 국가 레벨에서 높은 중요도를 
가정하였다.  
무역개방도와 국제 자본 유입은 국가 규모와 부의 관계를 보였으며, 몇몇 
정의 관계를 보이는 국가 계수에도 불구하고 효율성 가설과 (Liberati 2007) 같은 
맥락의 내용을 보여주었다. 본 연구는 크게 국가들의 정치, 경제, 사회 구조와 
연계된 개방도가 정부 규모에 영향을 미친다는 것을 보여준다. 개방도와 구조의 
차이는 어떻게 정부가 글로벌화의 혜택을 극대화하고 손실을 피하는지를 
설명해줄 수 있다. 본 연구는 세부적으로 이전 Islam (2004)의 8 개국을 대상으로 
실시된 국가별 비동질성을 활용한 정부 규모에 대한 글로벌화 영향을 확인해준다. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
                 The main purpose for this study is to assess globalization`s impact on the size of 
government. Globalization`s overarching features include trade, labor mobility, capital 
movement, and knowledge dissemination. The latter aspects facilitate funding source 
diversification, technology transfer, plus product diversity, which conduce to the creation of 
myriad benefits such as consumer price reduction, more efficiency, and bigger export markets 
for domestic manufacturers. Nonetheless, the latter advantages may render economies 
susceptible to supply shortages, output disruptions, income volatility, and currency 
fluctuations, which can culminate into intractable financial and economic crises. 
                 Consequently, this study underscores specific domestic policy implications, 
germane to mitigating globalization-induced risks, and maximizing its salutary benefits. 
Proxying globalization as trade openness in their seminal papers, both Cameron (1978) and 
Rodrik (1998) showed that over the years government spending 1 and the associated tax 
revenue had grown bigger, as a form of social insurance against the external risks to which 
small open economies were exposed. The latter alleviatory government response was 
christened the compensation hypothesis (Bretschger and Hettich 2002; Ram 2009).  
                 Antithetical to the compensation hypothesis is the efficiency theory, which 
postulates that capital mobility precludes high government taxation and spending, hence 
implying a negative correlation between globalization and government size (Garett and 
Mitchell 2001). Also, pervading the existing literature is the use of fixed effects estimators, 
which assume parameter homogeneity. However countries` social, economic, and political 
structures are disparate, bespeaking uniquely different responses to globalization. Islam (2004) 
showed that trade volatility`s impact on government size is “idiosyncratic, and that country 
                                                          
1Government spending may comprise expenditures related to, among other things, unemployment insurance, welfare benefits, social 
protection, and subsidies to companies to train and retain workers. 
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specific heterogeneity may determine the nature of the relationship between government size, 
openness, and volatility.” Hence, to consider parameter heterogeneity, the Mean Group 
Estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) is invoked, to retrace the effect of 
international trade, plus financial openness on government size. It is plausible that a reactive 
response to address globalization`s negative effects, and a pro-active strategy to maximize its 
benefits may both increase government spending, while a global credit crunch or uncertainty-
induced capital flight may both attenuate it.  
 
(A) STUDY MOTIVATION 
                 Government spending forms an integral part of aggregate demand, which also 
determines economic growth. So to exert a beneficial effect on economic growth, government 
spending may be invoked. Furthermore, risk diversification and trade liberalization are 
among the plausible channels, through which globalization may be a boon to the economy. 
Now, ways abound in which government spending may be occasioned or influenced by 
globalization. For example, a reactive response to address globalization`s negative effects, 
and a pro-active strategy designed to maximize its benefits, may increase government 
spending. On the other hand, a global credit crunch, or uncertainty-induced capital flight, 
may attenuate government spending. Therefore, the academic and practical import of the 
latter scenarios, coupled with their empirical allure constitute this study`s primary motivation. 
             (B)     STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
                 As globalization increases, the size of government also increases, to neutralize the 
negative effects induced by globalization, and thus a positive correlation is expected between 
the two variables (Rodrik 1998 and Cameron 1978). 
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(C) PROBLEM STATEMENT 
                 Globalization is touted for its myriad benefits, but also blame is imputed to it for 
the financial and economic crises it may engender and exacerbate (Hagelüken 2011). Social 
obligation and political pressure impel governments, to preserve and improve the 
competitiveness of domestic workers and infant-industries, but such interventions import 
financial commitments, which can either be a bane or a boon to the economy. For instance, 
government spending on health, infrastructure, and education can have a salutary effect on 
the economy, while funds expended on social programs can create a perverse dependence on 
the state, liquidating the incentive of welfare beneficiaries to start their own businesses or 
job-hunt. Worth noting, is that the mitigatory responses by government really beg the 
question, whether such interventions would be sustainable, and at what cost to the tax-payer.  
 (D)       THE STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER  
                 In chapter 2 the extant literature is reviewed, chapter 3 expatiates on econometric 
issues, the methodology adopted, and the data used. In chapter 4 the results are presented and 
main findings discussed, while Chapter 5 comprises the study`s pertinent policy implications, 
recommendations for further research, and conclusive remarks. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                 The extant literature includes globalization-triggered government spending; capital 
mobility preventing high taxation and government spending; and the no-correlation between 
globalization and government size views. Preceding the discussion on globalization and 
government size, is how both work to affect economic growth.   
(A) GOVERNMENT SIZE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
                 Invoking different proxies for government size and economic growth, studies on 
the relationship between the two latter variables show opposing correlations (Bergh and 
Henrekson 2011). For instance, by using either OECD member states or a heterogeneous 
mixture of both developed and developing countries, government size is shown to exert a 
negative effect on economic growth (Cameron 1982; Landau 1983; Marlow 1986; Agell et al. 
1997; Fölster and Henrekson 2001; Dar and AmirKhalkhali 2002; Romero-Avila and Strauch 
2008; Afonso and Furceri 2010; Bergh and Karlsson 2010). Basically, in an environment 
bereft of adequate financial and real resources, the negative impact is possible due to the 
crowding-out effect, where governments given to profligate spending borrow when taxes 
hardly suffice, potentially distorting resource allocation, and scanting the available capital for 
private investment, for they ultimately engender high interest rates (Bacon and Eltis 1976). 
                 On the other hand, while employing unique methodologies and different sample 
periods, either a positive correlation between government size and economic growth was 
ascertained, or the negative correlation between the two variables was found to be tenuous 
(Ram 1986; 2Lindert 2004; Agell et al. 2006; 3Madrik 2009; Colombier 2009). Besides 
supplementing an ineffective monetary policy, especially when interest rates are already low, 
                                                            
2Lindert, Peter. H. Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since The Eighteenth Century, Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
3 Madrik, Jeff. The case for big government, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
5 
 
akin to the scenario in most advanced countries during the 2008 global financial crisis, public 
expenditure can stimulate the macro-economy during low, negative growth periods, by 
increasing the aggregate demand level to make up for the reductions in other constituents of 
aggregate demand, such as decreased household spending on consumer goods, and reduced 
firms` spending on capital goods.  
(B) GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
               Studies using different proxies of globalization, while employing different 
econometric methods also yield dissimilar results. For example, some studies show a positive 
correlation between globalization and economic growth (Borensztein et al. 1998; Greenaway 
et al. 1999; Dollar and Kraay2001; Dreher 2006).  Others while proxying globalization as 
capital account openness, hardly found any effect of it on economic growth (Rodrik 1998; 
Alesina et al 1994).  Carkovic and Levine (2002) used foreign direct investment to represent 
globalization, but scarcely affirmed its robust influence on growth.  
            Most importantly, Garita (2009) indicates that albeit “higher levels of FDI in-flows 
stimulate GDP per worker growth, they crowd-in domestic investment for developing and 
emerging markets.” More so, Popov (2011) shows that output growth and growth variability 
are joint outcomes of financial liberalization, and that strong institutions enhance the growth 
benefits of financial liberalization, and mitigate its concomitant costs. Basically, an increase 
in export performance would expand demand, and mitigate the risks synonymous with 
relying on the local market, hence creating an increase in efficiency and productivity, plus 
boosting employment in labor-intensive sectors. 
 
( C) GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNMENT SIZE 
                 Cameron (1978) ascertained a positive association between trade openness and 
government size; then Rodrik (1998) plausibly explained that the positive correlation resulted 
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from greater exposure to international trade-induced external risks, which impel governments 
to invoke their debt or tax-financed spending abilities to ease the volatilities in domestic 
income and consumption. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) also explain the latter association, by 
empirically showing an inverse relationship between country size and government size.                  
However, scholars on the topic of globalization and government size, are basically 
distinguishable according to their espousal and empirical affirmation of either 
the 4compensation hypothesis (Cameron 1978; Ruggie 1982; Rodrik 1998; 5Bretschger and 
Hettich 2002; Paolo and Gancia 2008; Carmignani and Colombo 2008; Ram 2009) or the 
efficiency theory (6Garett and Mitchell 2001; Islam 2004; Molana et al. 2004; Liberati 2007; 
Benarroch and Pandey 2007; Kimakova 2009).7  
               The compensation hypothesis postulates that government spending increases to 
mitigate the external risks engendered by international trade; while the efficiency hypothesis 
posits that government spending would decrease, as globalization-induced capital mobility 
increases. “The basic tenet of the efficiency hypothesis is that governments may collect less 
tax revenue, and can hardly run budget deficits in response to increased capital openness, 
because mobile capital may easily disapprove of unpalatable tax policies, or lax budget 
policies by moving abroad, ultimately leading to a tighter expenditure policy” (Liberati 2007). 
                 Practically, compensation can prevail against efficiency in policy choice, hence 
creating a positive globalization-spending relationship. Also, efficiency considerations may 
prevail over the incentives for compensation, causing a negative association between 
globalization and government spending. Alternatively, compensation and efficiency can offset 
each other, such that the empirical results would show no significant association between 
                                                          
4 Initially proposed by Dani Rodrik (1998), and traceable back to David Cameron (1978). 
5provide evidence that both capital openness and trade openness may positively affect the level of social welfare expenditures 
6Use data from 18 OECD countries over the 1961-1993 period and find that trade openness negatively influences government spending, but 
not government consumption and social security transfers. 
7“A prominent variant of the compensation hypothesis rests on the premise that increased trade exposure heightens domestic economic 
volatility, prompting demands for compensation via generous systems of transfers and services; hence it predicts a positive correlation 
between trade openness and government spending, with the direction of causality running from the former to the latter” (Rodrik 1998, p2). 
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globalization and government size (Garett 2000). Lending credence to the latter view, Kittel 
and Winner (2005) re-estimated the Garrett and Mitchell (2001) model, by employing more 
refined empirical techniques, but found no evidence supporting either the efficiency theory or 
the compensation hypothesis. Rather they submitted that public expenditures are mainly a 
function of “domestic economic and demographic variables, such as unemployment and the 
dependency ratio” (Meinhard and Potrafke 2012).  
                 More statistical evidence suggests that “globalization poses less employment, 
wage, and growth risk in OECD countries, and that any correlation between openness and 
welfare, whether positive or negative, may be spurious” (Iversen and Cusack 2000). It 
suffices to note that “the net effect of the opposite forces of the compensation hypothesis, and 
of the efficiency theory is rather uncertain from a theoretical point of view, and it is basically 
a matter for empirical investigation” (Liberati 2007).  
                 Unlike earlier studies, which assumed country homogeneity in their fixed and 
random effects panel regressions, coupled with using pooled OLS models, this paper invokes 
a model that considers country-specific characteristics in data analysis, to plausibly broaden 
the understanding of how globalization`s integral aspects, which are loaded with economic, 
social, and political significance, affect the size of government.  
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MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
(A) ECONOMETRIC ISSUES: ADOPTING THE MEAN GROUP ESTIMATOR (MGE) 
                 “It is now quite common to have panels in which both N (the number of groups) 
and T (the number of time periods) are quite large” (Pesaran and Smith 1995). Large enough, 
this study uses 25 countries, selected on the basis of data availability, for a period spanning 
32 years (1973-2005). The latter panels, are distinguished from the small T panels in micro-
econometrics, and conveniently referred to as “data fields” (Quah 1990). So when T is 
sufficiently big, by employing the MGE it makes sense to run individual regressions for each 
group, and then compute the parameter of interest`s average effect on the dependent variable. 
                 However, the MGE ignores the possibility that “certain parameters may be the 
same across groups” (Pesaran 1998). Nonetheless, there are cogent reasons to expect unique 
disparity in parameters across groups. For instance, the integration of countries into the world 
trading system is at different stages, economic development in countries is not the same, the 
disinclination to relinquish national autonomy, in submission to global rules prevails, plus the 
revered cultural differences in countries, which may compromise the amenability to cultural 
homogenization 8 , all imply that the different forms of economic, political, and social 
openness across countries, will affect their government sizes differently. 
                 Now, “common in the existing literature are traditional pooled estimators, such as 
the fixed and random effects models, where the intercepts are allowed to differ across groups, 
while all other coefficients and error-variances are constrained to be the same” (Pesaran et al 
1998). The latter coefficient homogeneity assumption, despite its wide adoption seems 
implausible (Mairesse and Griliches 1990). In addition, “the group mean estimator, obtained 
by averaging the coefficients for each group, is consistent for large N and T, and thus 
                                                          
8This means a reduction in cultural diversity. 
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provides a standard of comparison. Conversely, the pooled and aggregate estimators are not 
consistent in dynamic models, even for large N and T, and the biases can be very substantial. 
The problem arises because when the regressor are serially correlated, incorrectly ignoring 
coefficient heterogeneity induces serial correlation in the disturbance, which generates 
inconsistent estimates in models with lagged dependent variables, even as T→∞” (Pesaran 
and Smith 1995). 
                 Against this background, to test the hypothesis that globalization exerts a positive 
impact on government size, parsimonious heterogeneous static models are considered below, 
in which the controlled parameters are the averages of specific group coefficients: 
Yit= βixit+ λiωit+ εit,     i= 1, 2…Nt = 1, 2… T,            (1) 
Yit= βiψit+ λiωit+ εit,     i= 1, 2…Nt = 1, 2… T, (2) 
                 Where the coefficients λi and βi are varying across the groups: 
xit = Indicators of globalization, including logarithms of Trade Openness, Financial Openness, 
Mean Tariff Rate, International Capital Flows, Political Globalization, and Social 
Globalization. 
ψit = Logarithm of the 2010 KOF Overall Globalization Index, consisting of Economic, 
Political, and Social Globalization. 
ωit = Control variables comprising logarithms of Population Size and Real Income Per Capita. 
i = Country Index, and 
t = Time Index 
ε = Error Term 
                 The “average’ long-run effect of X on Y, is then defined in terms of the “average” 
of the short-run coefficient, β / (1- λ ), where 
β = N-1∑
Ν
=1i
βi                  and       λ = N-1∑
Ν
=1i
λi 
10 
 
                 In both the base-line model (equation 1), and in equation (2), “logarithms of the 
dependent and explanatory variables are used, to better account for the outliers, smooth the 
distributions of the variables, and also to interpret the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables as elasticities” (Meinhard and Potrafke, 2011). “Furthermore, the log 
transformations effectively deal with the heteroscedasticity problems that would otherwise 
plague the analysis, given the long right hand tails in many of the variables” (Garrett 2001).  
 
(B) DATA 
                 Expense (% of GDP) is this paper`s main dependent variable and proxy for 
government size. According to the World Bank, it basically constitutes “cash payments for 
operating activities of the government in providing goods and services, including 
compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social 
benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends.”  Another used dependent variable is 
the General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP). As per the World 
Bank, although it incorporates “all government current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services, including compensation of employees, and most of the expenditures on national 
defense and security, it excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation.”   
                 Affirming robustness, the other predicted variable is the Tax Revenue (% of GDP). 
The World Bank explains that “tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and 
most social security contributions are excluded.” Nevertheless, even though the compensation 
hypothesis suggests that citizens would demand for more expenditures and not taxes per se, 
but because 9total government spending is highly correlated with taxes, even if Rodrik (1998) 
                                                          
9 See Table 2 Panel B and C. 
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specifically implied redistributive expenses, still automatic stabilizers would act via the 
ability of taxes and transfers to stabilize disposable income, and thus when referencing the 
stabilization role of fiscal policy, the revenue to GDP ratio comes across as an appropriate 
metric to measure government size (Cottarelli and Fedelino 2010). 
                 Besides, the impact economic integration exerts on tax revenues, manifests the 
efficiency hypothesis, for tax competition may serve to deter governments from increasing the 
tax burden on mobile tax bases (Gordon 1986; Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991; Razin and 
Sadka 1991; Tanzi 1995). By exerting a subversive influence on autonomous fiscal policies, 
in consequence capital openness literally creates mobile tax bases, which afford markets the 
option of “transcending politics,” while effectively discouraging inefficient taxation, because 
more favorable and efficient tax systems would be preferred and sought out (Lee and 
McKenzie 1989; Kurzer 1993; Steinmo 1994; Tanzi 1995). Therefore, besides governments` 
shares of consumption and expenses in GDP, tax revenues are also included in this analysis, 
to strike a fair balance between the compensation hypothesis and the efficiency theory. 
                 Now, globalization`s effect on government size is analyzed, by including other 
control variables, so as to avoid the impression that the attained result is an artifact, created 
by the omission of variables.  The share of export and import to GDP is this study`s main 
predictor, because international trade is inherently observed as the first stage of globalization. 
Governments, due to international trade are goaded into giving subsidies to domestic 
producers, to help them compete against low-cost foreign imports, and to gain export markets. 
In addition, an increase in imports not only engenders dependence on goods from abroad, and 
thus exposing the country to consumption volatilities, but it may also be linked to an increase 
in domestic income per capita, which coupled with an increase in exports may be an 
extractive opportunity for government.  
12 
 
                 Financial Openness is also controlled and reckoned as Total Assets plus Total 
Liabilities to GDP, with its basic constituents obtained from the External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Financial integration offers a broader 
gamut of portfolios, which facilitates higher productivity, allowing an open economy to 
diversify some of the country-speciﬁc risk, and thus exposing it to less volatility. “In line 
with the conventional wisdom that capital mobility may undermine the ability of 
governments to tax and to spend, financial openness may negatively affect government size” 
(Liberati 2007).  
                 Also among the explanatory variables is the Customs and Other Import Duties (% 
of tax revenue). Besides its revenue function to governments, a reduction in mean tariff rates 
would present a veritable platform, upon which globalization may increase to affect 
government size and economic growth. International Capital Flows Index (Abiad et al 2008) 
is controlled too.  A relaxation of capital flow regulations would increase globalization, affect 
government size, and also economic growth. 
                 Population Size is another controlled predictor. Proxying country size, a reduction 
in population size suggests an increased integration into the world economy, and thus greater 
government size (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998). Controlled along with population size, is Real 
Income Per Capita. An increase in the latter not only means a broader tax base to 
governments, but citizens may also increasingly demand quality social goods and services 
from governments, triggering off an expansion of the public economy (Wagner 1883). Then 
again, Wildavsky (1974) counter-argues that “the degree of expansion in the scope of the 
public economy varies inversely, rather than directly with economic growth.” 
                 Finally, to capture all the significant dimensions of globalization, the 2010 KOF 
Overall Globalization Index is employed, while controlling for Population Size and Real 
GDP Per Capita. The Globalization Index comprises the social, economic, and political 
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aspects of globalization. Also reported are the regression results for the period between 1985 
and 2005, since the usage of the term globalization in the mid 1980s, is presumed to have 
began (IMF 2000).  Table 1 displays a summary of all the employed study data, including 
their abbreviations and sources.  
 
   TABLE 1: DATA AND THEIR RELATED SOURCES 
VARIABLE ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
Government 
Expense 
(% of GDP) 
EXP Main Dependent 
Variable 
NYU Development Research Institute (Global 
Development Network Growth Database), WDI, and 
OECD 
General 
government 
final 
consumption 
expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
 
CON  Dependent 
Variable. 
WDI 
Tax revenue 
(% of GDP) 
 
TAX Dependent 
Variable 
OECD, WDI 
Globalization 
Index 
GLO Control Variable. 
2010 KOF overall 
globalization 
index 
Dreher, Axel; Noel Gaston and Pim Martens, 2008, 
Measuring Globalization 
 - Gauging its Consequence, New York: Springer. 
 
Political 
Globalization 
PGLO Control Variable KOF INDEX 
 
Social 
Globalization 
SGLO Control Variable KOF INDEX 
 
Population 
Size 
POP Control Variable WDI 
GDP Per 
Capita 
(Constant 
2000 US$) 
 
RYC Control Variable WDI 
International 
Capital Flows 
INCAP Control Variable Abiad, Abdul, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel, 
"A New Database of Financial Reforms," IMF Working 
Paper WP/08/266, December 2008 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm). 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
 
TRA Control Variable. WDI 
Financial 
Openness (%) 
FOP Control Variable Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, “The External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II" , Journal of International Economics 
73, 223-250, November 2007 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
           Summary statistics for all the variables are given in Table 2 below, which also 
includes the correlation matrix. 
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
PANEL A:                 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 CON TAX EXP GLO PGLO SGLO TRA FOP TAR POP RYC INCAP 
OBS 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 
MEAN 17.96 31.55 36.80 67.68 80.90 62.97 61.93 166.75 8.81 5.05 16683.17 2.23 
STD 4.68 10.20 12.85 15.95 16.69 19.51 29.60 201.04 11.16 25.10 9585.08 0.98 
MEDIAN 18.24 31.75 35.72 70.76 88.12 66.32 57.89 106.87 8.15 0.01 16817.60 3.00 
MINI 7.52 8.53 10.38 22.67 7.98 20.32 9.10 7.52 -0.12 0.00 362.58 0.00 
MAX 29.59 52.26 67.87 93.81 98.78 95.01 182.88 1985.12 143.70 170.00 40584.24 3.00 
PANEL B:                  CORRELATION MATRIX 
 CON TAX EXP GLO PGLO SGLO TRA FOP TAR POP RYC INCAP 
CONS 1.00            
TAX 0.82 1.00           
EXP 0.75 0.80 1.00          
GLO 0.54 0.74 0.58 1.00         
PGLO 0.47 0.69 0.49 0.79 1.00        
SGLO 0.53 0.70 0.51 0.95 0.66 1.00       
TRA 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.47 0.16 0.36 1.00      
FOP 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.54 0.26 0.49 0.64 1.00     
TAR -0.31 -0.41 -0.38 -0.46 -0.35 -0.44 -0.16 -0.19 1.00    
POP 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.00 1.00   
RYC 0.32 0.56 0.36 0.67 0.59 0.71 0.08 0.40 -0.33 0.17 1.00  
INCAP 0.15 0.29 0.22 0.55 0.32 0.57 0.13 0.35 -0.34 -0.01 0.47 1.00 
PANEL C:  CORRELATION MATRIX WITH LOGARITHMIC VARIABLES 
 CON TAX EXP GLO PGLO SGLO TRA FOP TAR POP RYC INCAP 
CONS 1.00            
TAX 0.79 1.00           
EXP 0.73 0.75 1.00          
GLO 0.51 0.74 0.55 1.00         
PGLO 0.36 0.62 0.38 0.79 1.00        
SGLO 0.54 0.74 0.52 0.95 0.63 1.00       
TRA 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.10 0.36 1.00      
FOP 0.30 0.45 0.45 0.74 0.43 0.69 0.63 1.00     
TAR -0.18 -0.26 -0.26 -0.35 -0.23 -0.31 -0.13 -0.34 1.00    
POP 0.11 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.18 0.03 -0.30 -0.12 0.12 1.00   
RYC 0.31 0.60 0.37 0.70 0.62 0.69 0.06 0.45 -0.16 0.14 1.00  
INCAP 0.16 0.32 0.16 0.54 0.35 0.56 0.05 0.50 -0.24 0.04 0.42 1.00 
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Panel C of Table 2 shows that reductions in tariff rates increase all the three measures of 
government size (Con, Tax, and Exp), while as expected they increase globalization and its 
related proxies. However, decreasing tariffs may hurt domestic producers, exposing them to 
increased foreign competition in their home market, which in consequence causes local prices 
to drop. As local producers` sales plummet, all else being equal, the decrease in production 
and prices may impel domestic producers to hire fewer workers, and thus engendering a 
reduction in consumer spending.  
                 So although an increase in tariffs raises government revenues, a similar reduction 
in tariff rates may also goad governments into spending more on subsidies, to protect local 
infant industries, besides expending money on programs pertaining to unemployment 
insurance and welfare benefits. A positive correlation between international capital flows and 
financial openness, suggests that the former may increase due to trade in equity and debt 
markets, especially as the integration of world financial markets increases (Hnatkovska and 
Evans2005). An abundant supply of international capital may increase the size of Exp, Con, 
and Tax (Kaminsky et al 2005).   
                 Table 3 shows country level means for the variables. Countries with above-
average government size measures, such as Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
also not only have above-average measures of trade openness, financial openness, and the 
overall globalization index, but also their real income per capita rates (RYC) are rather high, 
above the RYC mean of about US$ 16,683 (See Table 2). The aforementioned welfare states 
prove that even prodigious spending can be judicious enough, to effect economic 
development; suffice it to say that government spending should be subjected to economic 
rationale, and not unavailing political processes. Here social globalization inspires spending 
efficiency, because political awareness may embolden the citizens to mobilize, and demand 
for greater government transparency and accountability. 
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TABLE 3: SAMPLED COUNTRIES AND THEIR MEAN VARIABLES (1973-2005) 
COUNTRY CON TAX EXP RYC IN CAP TRA FOP TAR PGLO SGLO 
Australia 18 27 30 23606 2 34 99 6 86 77 
Austria 19 41 45 25043 2 73 165 4 93 81 
Belgium 22 43 53 18206 2 127 375 7 94 73 
Canada 21 34 22 19259 3 60 138 4 92 85 
Denmark 26 46 51 24055 2 72 177 9 93 76 
Finland 21 42 48 18485 2 60 147 4 90 64 
France 22 41 48 18002 2 46 168 4 96 70 
Germany 20 36 37 18719 3 51 136 3 68 75 
Greece 16 27 34 10020 2 50 85 5 76 48 
Ireland 19 32 41 15646 2 123 542 5 80 68 
Italy 18 36 46 15666 2 44 101 9 93 55 
Jamaica 16 16 33 3219 2 93 169 16 76 57 
Japan 15 26 34 30344 3 22 76 7 78 59 
Korea 12 18 17 7022 2 65 62 17 65 42 
Mexico 10 16 20 4992 2 38 66 12 69 42 
Netherlands 23 42 51 18863 3 110 310 9 93 79 
New Zealand 18 33 41 11770 2 57 125 7 74 68 
Norway 20 42 44 28358 2 74 138 6 90 72 
Portugal 15 26 38 8402 2 58 148 0 76 54 
Spain 16 29 30 11107 2 41 105 5 83 64 
Sweden 27 48 54 22849 2 68 165 4 95 80 
Switzerland 11 26 30 31836 3 73 483 12 83 85 
Turkey 11 16 21 3347 2 33 45 36 76 37 
United States 16 27 33 27753 3 20 86 8 91 68 
Zimbabwe 18 21 33 509 1 56 58 14 44 29 
 
 
Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, Pesaran`s (2004) CD test 
for cross-section dependence in macro-panel data is duly performed, and the results reported 
in Table 4.  With the exception of LINCAP in Table 4, all investigated variables are shown 
to be statistically significant at the 1% level, hence rejecting the null hypothesis.                 
 
TABLE 4: CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE & UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
CON TAX EXP GLO PGLO SGLO POP RYC INCAP TRA FOP TAR 
 Panel A:          Cross-section Dependence (CD) Test 
Pesaran 23.31*** 58.32*** 36.78*** 93.61*** 53.26*** 84.29*** 93.26*** 81.50*** 0.00 53.60*** 81.96*** 14.11*** 
 Panel B:          IPS 
Levels -0.43 -1.64 2.35 0.59 -1.64 3.71*** 2.54 -0.86 0.00 0.05 0.90 13.36*** 
Differences -6.12*** -8.96*** -7.70*** 6.68*** -6.46*** 10.74*** 1.95** 5.43*** 0.00 12.51*** -0.25*** 11.44*** 
 Panel C:          CIPS 
Levels 0.10 2.19 1.12 -0.32 3.48 -1.14 2.07 -0.55 3.56 0.72 2.69 -2.38*** 
Differences -2.94*** -4.44*** -6.64*** -5.98*** -3.97*** -7.41*** 2.39 -2.69*** -2.61*** -4.60*** -3.88*** -5.52*** 
Notes: *** Parameter is significant at 1% level, and ** Parameter is significant at 5% level. 
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                The presence of unit roots is investigated, because “they can induce spurious 
correlation among time series” (Granger and Newbold 1974). If two variables are trending 
over time, a regression of one on the other could have a high R2, even if the two are totally 
unrelated. More so, the typical t-ratios scarcely follow a t-distribution, and thus hypothesis 
tests concerning the regression parameters cannot be validly undertaken (Stavros 2005). 
Therefore, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test for unit roots in panel data-sets, under the null 
hypothesis that all panels have unit roots was performed. Apart from LSGLO and LTAR, 
which were statistically significant at the 1% level, all the other variables had unit roots in 
levels. First differences were taken to induce stationarity, with two lags and a trend, and all 
became stationary and thus integrated of order 1. In the case of LINCAP, no results were 
generated for the stationarity tests, perhaps due to lack of a huge variation among the selected 
countries.  
                 In addition, a t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-section 
dependence, as proposed by Pesaran (2003) was performed. Null hypothesis assumes that all 
series are non-stationary. Unit roots were present in levels, failing to reject the null, but when 
first differences were taken to induce stationarity, all were statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and thus rejecting the null hypothesis. So, the study reports Pooled OLS in levels and 
first differences. Akin to previous studies in the literature, to control for omitted variables that 
differ among panels, but are constant over time, Fixed Effects Regression results are also 
reported, though special focus is on the MGE coefficient signs, for the variables related to 
openness. A positive sign of the LTRA MGE-coefficient would support the validity of the 
compensation hypothesis, and a positive sign on the LGLO MGE-coefficient, would extend 
its validity to include “overall globalization.” On the other hand, negative signs would 
support the efficiency theory.  
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(A) TRADE OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LEXP) 
                 Table 5 shows the effects of globalization on government size, as measured by 
LEXP. Although not statistically significant, the MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was 
negative. Among countries, the LTRA MGE-coefficient was positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, only for Sweden and France. On the other hand, the LTRA MGE-
coefficient was not only negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for Greece and 
Italy, but it was also negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for Switzerland and 
Mexico.  
                In Table 6, showing globalization`s effect on government size between 1985 and 
2005, the MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was negative, though statistically insignificant. 
Among specific countries, for the case of Norway, the LTRA MGE-coefficient was negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, while for Italy and Denmark it was also negative 
but statistically significant at the 5% level. By and large, the “average effect” of LTRA on 
LEXP was negative but statistically insignificant, and thus tenuously supporting the efficiency 
hypothesis.  
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TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LEXP), 1973- 2005 
 MODEL (1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia -0.0848 
(-0.67) 
0.0672 
(1.04) 
-0.0146 
(-0.44) 
0.0565** 
(2.17) 
1.5090 
(1.01) 
-1.1477** 
(-1.97) 
-0.4579 
(-0.75) 
2.8282*** 
(3.47) 
0.3225 
(0.74) 
Austria -0.1254 
(-0.39) 
-0.3327** 
(-2.46) 
0.0126 
(1.31) 
-0.0035 
(-0.05) 
-0.3865 
(-0.19) 
0.0240 
(0.02) 
0.0251 
(0.05) 
0.1954 
(1.40) 
0.2727 
(0.51) 
Belgium 0.0441 
(0.19) 
0.5144*** 
(3.94) 
-0.0029 
(-0.13) 
-0.0706 
(-0.41) 
-1.1733 
(-0.30) 
0.9260 
(0.95) 
2.1907*** 
(2.64) 
-0.3596 
(-1.36) 
-1.2728 
(-1.35) 
Canada 0.1348 
(0.60) 
-0.1160 
(-0.42) 
0.2171*** 
(3.22) 
0.0148 
(0.08) 
7.0160** 
(2.49) 
-1.6492*** 
(-2.76) 
-3.2297*** 
(-4.85) 
0.4367 
(1.24) 
-2.4030*** 
(-4.52) 
Denmark 0.2629 
(0.59) 
-0.2039 
(-0.96) 
318.0266 
(0.54) 
-0.1782 
(-1.93) 
-18.8432*** 
(-2.85) 
17.0335** 
(2.48) 
0.0958 
(0.07) 
1.9943** 
(2.19) 
1.9172 
(1.95) 
Finland -0.0865 
(-1.37) 
-0.0582 
(-1.44) 
0.0034 
(0.76) 
0.0394 
(1.12) 
-1.5944 
(-0.43) 
-0.4684** 
(-2.31) 
-0.2158 
(-1.30) 
0.0649 
(0.59) 
-1.9814*** 
(-2.71) 
France 0.3562** 
(1.98) 
-0.4673*** 
(-3.40) 
0.0390*** 
(3.55) 
-0.0139 
(-0.24) 
-11.4833 
(-1.90) 
-1.1738 
(-1.91) 
2.0878*** 
(3.59) 
0.4197** 
(2.01) 
2.6707*** 
(6.43) 
Germany 0.0863 
(0.86) 
-0.2553*** 
(-3.86) 
-19.9966 
(-1.40) 
0.1274 
(0.42) 
1.3478 
(1.34) 
0.6161** 
(2.10) 
0.6866*** 
(5.69) 
0.4294 
(0.71) 
1.5209*** 
(3.68) 
Greece -0.7358*** 
(-2.94) 
0.2620 
(1.19) 
-0.0630 
(-1.15) 
-0.0083 
(-0.05) 
-0.0207 
(-0.01) 
0.5858 
(1.14) 
0.0772 
(0.24) 
0.0598 
(0.16) 
1.1976*** 
(4.12) 
Ireland 0.2867 
(1.79) 
-0.2603*** 
(-3.19) 
0.0078 
(0.52) 
0.0128 
(0.22) 
2.9989*** 
(4.75) 
-0.4869 
(-1.47) 
0.8261*** 
(2.61) 
-0.4544 
(-1.38) 
1.2262*** 
(4.52) 
Italy -0.3265*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.2188** 
(-2.25) 
-0.6935 
(-0.74) 
0.1492*** 
(2.77) 
3.1329 
(1.25) 
1.2597*** 
(2.84) 
0.8967 
(1.83) 
0.1207 
(0.76) 
-0.7178 
(-1.08) 
Jamaica 0.0398 
(0.30) 
0.0089 
(0.11) 
0.0414 
(0.48) 
-0.0134 
(-0.19) 
-6.8339*** 
(-4.08) 
-1.3609*** 
(-4.15) 
0.1101 
(0.84) 
0.2451 
(1.75) 
0.6384** 
(2.20) 
Japan 0.2006 
(  1.66) 
0.1896 
(1.70) 
-0.0587 
(-0.90) 
0.6010*** 
(3.37) 
8.9939*** 
(4.28) 
0.2788 
(0.52) 
0.1170 
(0.51) 
0.0901 
(0.14) 
-0.6002 
(-0.83) 
Korea -0.0621 
(-0.42) 
-0.0647 
(-0.69) 
0.2247** 
(2.42) 
0.0150 
(0.21) 
0.9919 
(1.28) 
-1.5203*** 
(-3.96) 
0.3467*** 
(2.93) 
-0.0813 
(-0.46) 
0.1769 
(0.98) 
Mexico -0.3365** 
(-2.50) 
0.4015*** 
(3.90) 
0.0067 
(0.09) 
-0.2250*** 
(-2.92) 
0.2509 
(0.22) 
0.5479 
(1.45) 
0.1755 
(0.76) 
0.3346 
(0.98) 
-1.7963** 
(-2.45) 
Netherlands -0.0108 
(-0.10) 
-0.0166 
(-0.44) 
-0.8994** 
(-2.34) 
0.0388 
(1.57) 
4.8797 
(1.58) 
-1.7036*** 
(-7.36) 
-0.1060 
(-0.53) 
0.3335*** 
(3.19) 
0.7780*** 
(2.31) 
New Zealand 0.0392 
(0.47) 
0.0035 
(0.06) 
-0.0493*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.0286 
(-0.69) 
-0.3298 
(-0.66) 
-1.7874*** 
(-7.03) 
-0.7016*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.0297 
(-0.18) 
-0.6912*** 
(-3.46) 
Norway -0.2211 
(-1.11) 
0.0234 
(0.24) 
0.0450 
(1.42) 
0.2383*** 
(3.85) 
-2.2892 
(-0.36) 
-0.2027 
(-0.56) 
0.0939 
(0.36) 
-0.3766 
(-1.11) 
-0.2277 
(-0.33) 
Portugal 
 
0.1473 
(1.23) 
0.1349** 
(2.55) 
-0.0261 
(-0.62) 
0.0956 
(1.66) 
3.1869*** 
(3.44) 
 
0.0252 
(0.08) 
-0.2041 
(-0.78) 
0.4348 
(1.52) 
0.3668 
(1.61) 
Spain -0.1026 
(-0.52) 
-0.1777 
(-1.81) 
0.0432*** 
(2.99) 
0.1031 
(1.15) 
-6.7106*** 
(-4.17) 
-3.9770*** 
(-7.23) 
0.7581** 
(2.46) 
-0.0666 
(-0.30) 
1.3489** 
(2.14) 
Sweden 0.6065** 
(2.11) 
-0.6766*** 
(-3.02) 
0.0510 
(1.49) 
0.1434 
(1.09) 
-17.0272*** 
(-3.49) 
-4.0098*** 
(-4.99) 
0.1964 
(0.20) 
-1.4581 
(-0.76) 
-1.9848 
(-1.47) 
Switzerland -0.9896** 
(-2.04) 
-0.1735 
(-0.72) 
-0.0629 
(-0.63) 
-0.5716 
(-1.95) 
-13.0197*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.4680 
(-0.52) 
0.0751 
(0.12) 
-1.2396 
(-1.01) 
0.5550 
(0.59) 
Turkey 0.0007 
(0.00) 
0.5325 
(1.29) 
-0.0325 
(-0.35) 
0.0869 
(0.60) 
-2.5950 
(-0.64) 
0.4828 
(0.39) 
0.5889 
(1.20) 
-0.2195 
(-0.49) 
0.4556 
(1.23) 
United States 0.2793 
(0.75) 
-0.3322 
(-0.68) 
-0.0027 
(-0.02) 
   0.0000 
(0.00) 
-20.815** 
(-2.52) 
-3.3529*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.8070 
(-0.38) 
0.1667 
(0.25) 
1.3414 
(1.41) 
Zimbabwe -0.2948 
(-1.88) 
0.1467** 
(2.25) 
-0.1153 
(-1.49) 
-0.1057 
(-1.20) 
-0.8005 
(-1.24) 
-0.5052 
(-1.65) 
0.0714 
(0.93) 
2.3494*** 
(2.82) 
-0.0542 
(-0.17) 
Pooled OLS   
(Levels) 
0.1590*** 
(4.33) 
0.0393 
(1.36) 
-0.0313*** 
(-5.20) 
-0.1367 *** 
(-3.73) 
0.0108 
(1.94) 
0.0008 
(0.03) 
0.1162** 
(2.16) 
0.4223*** 
(6.66) 
1.0981*** 
(14.39) 
Pooled OLS (First Diff.) -0.0358 
(-0.84) 
0.0499 
(1.92) 
0.0045 
(0.71) 
-0.0032 
(-0.20) 
-0.3545 
(-1.22) 
-0.4577*** 
(-4.54) 
0.0906** 
(2.04) 
0.001 
(0.91) 
0.1899 
 (0.061) 
Fixed Effects -0.0758 
(-1.69) 
0.1050*** 
(4.58) 
-0.0069 
(-1.33) 
-0.0210 
(-0.98) 
0.1654 
(1.45) 
-0.1370** 
(-2.56) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.3858*** 
(6.67) 
0.7076*** 
(8.19) 
MGE -0.0357 
(-0.53) 
-0.0429 
(-0.74) 
11.8684 
(0.93) 
0.0201 
(0.51) 
-2.7846 
(-1.77) 
-0.0814 
(-0.11) 
0.1479 
(0.75) 
0.2487 
(1.32) 
0.1224 
(0.47) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific coefficients, the 
numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% respectively. Time dummies are 
included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. Model 2 represents Government Size 
against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LEXP), 1985-2005 
 MODEL (1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia -0.1606 
(-1.11) 
0.0214 
(0.28) 
-0.0207 
(-0.62) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
1.0470 
(0.68) 
-1.2426** 
(-2.12) 
-0.5555 
(-0.91) 
3.3270*** 
(3.55) 
0.5673 
(1.39) 
Austria -0.4415 
(-0.56) 
-0.7643*** 
(-3.48) 
0.0007 
(0.05) 
-0.1741 
(-1.78) 
2.1773 
(0.42) 
1.6377 
(0.67) 
0.0469 
(0.07) 
-6.9604 
(-1.35) 
-0.7886 
(-0.49) 
Belgium 0.0096 
(0.06) 
-0.0064 
(-0.09) 
0.0075 
(0.60) 
0.0992 
(1.29) 
2.4136 
(0.80) 
-1.0282 
(-1.52) 
0.3378 
(1.00) 
-1.1751*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.2754 
(-1.33) 
Canada 0.1233 
(0.44) 
-0.4302 
(-1.05) 
-0.0100 
(-0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
7.3152** 
(2.09) 
-0.4877 
(-0.65) 
-0.0461 
(-0.06) 
-1.0081 
(-0.31) 
-1.6912*** 
(-5.32) 
Denmark -0.2072** 
(-2.32) 
-0.1492*** 
(-3.12) 
-19.8438 
(-0.17) 
-0.0043 
(-0.15) 
0.6657 
(0.25) 
-2.1591 
(-0.76) 
-0.4596 
(-1.37) 
1.5033*** 
(3.83) 
0.8264*** 
(3.10) 
Finland -0.1111 
(-1.29) 
-0.0181 
(-0.24) 
0.0060 
(0.99) 
0.0048 
(0.07) 
4.7086 
(0.40) 
-0.1973 
(-0.36) 
-0.1861 
(-0.78) 
0.0867 
(0.64) 
-0.3438** 
(-2.47) 
France -0.0508 
(-0.70) 
0.0024 
(0.05) 
-0.0058 
(-1.82) 
0.0754*** 
(2.81) 
-0.7562 
(-0.37) 
-1.0008*** 
(-5.04) 
0.5082 
(1.84) 
-0.4974 
(-1.04) 
1.1385*** 
(4.23) 
Germany -0.0107 
(-0.11) 
-0.1182 
(-1.85) 
132.9145 
(0.94) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
1.2028 
(0.74) 
1.1720*** 
(3.89) 
0.7654*** 
(8.66) 
0.2174 
(0.51) 
1.3336  
(3.35) 
Greece 0.6231 
(1.49) 
0.2185 
(0.84) 
-0.0046 
(-0.11) 
0.0196 
(0.13) 
2.2455 
(0.31) 
-0.2213 
(-0.33) 
0.0996 
(0.52) 
0.1702 
(0.58) 
-0.4947 
(-1.23) 
Ireland 0.0053 
(0.04) 
-0.0835 
(-1.14) 
0.0198** 
(2.21) 
-0.0164 
(-0.23) 
0.8789 
(1.58) 
-0.2586 
(-0.98) 
1.0639*** 
(5.26) 
-0.3604 
(-0.42) 
0.9815*** 
(3.10) 
Italy -0.3457** 
(-2.36) 
-0.1063 
(-0.65) 
-0.6469 
(-0.92) 
0.1976 
(1.67) 
1.7675 
(0.51) 
0.2247 
(0.22) 
0.2894 
(0.49) 
0.2763 
(1.19) 
0.7177 
(1.26) 
Jamaica 0.3512 
(1.13) 
-0.0557 
(-0.30) 
0.0438  
(0.41) 
-0.0991 
(-0.85) 
-8.2170 
(-1.02) 
-1.3637 
(-1.80) 
0.0062 
(0.03) 
0.3363 
(1.33) 
0.7919** 
(2.40) 
Japan -0.0388 
(-0.52) 
0.0895** 
(2.12) 
-0.0538*** 
(-2.87) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-1.3007 
(-0.23) 
0.5162 
(1.90) 
-0.0028 
(-0.04) 
0.2354 
(0.89) 
-0.1641 
(-0.80) 
Korea 0.0895 
(0.74) 
0.0050 
(0.04) 
0.1590** 
(2.00) 
0.0340 
(0.48) 
-2.0846 
(-0.67) 
-1.1540** 
(-2.12) 
0.0859 
(0.60) 
0.1552 
(0.88) 
-0.0917 
(-0.36) 
Mexico -0.4332 
(-1.83) 
0.4797*** 
(3.03) 
-0.2018 
(-1.73) 
-0.0538 
(-0.63) 
-3.6937 
(-0.69) 
0.6355 
(0.89) 
-0.0640 
(-0.27) 
0.0584 
(0.07) 
-0.1548 
(-0.30) 
Netherlands -0.0890 
(-0.56) 
0.0014 
(0.02) 
-0.9737** 
(-2.33) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
4.4229 
(1.16) 
-1.5462*** 
(-4.13) 
0.0179 
(0.04) 
0.5709 
(0.55) 
-0.0264 
(-0.04) 
New Zealand 0.2946** 
(2.48) 
0.0159 
(0.24) 
-0.0057 
(-0.32) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.4867 
(-0.86) 
-0.7255 
(-1.83) 
-0.3820 
(-1.16) 
-1.6076*** 
(-3.51) 
-1.1761*** 
(-4.17) 
Norway -0.9015*** 
(-5.22) 
-0.0185 
(-0.22) 
0.0014 
(0.06) 
-0.1235 
(-1.58) 
-26.0129*** 
(-5.01) 
-0.3028 
(-0.78) 
-0.3456 
(-1.24) 
0.2875 
(0.32) 
0.1210 
(0.16) 
Portugal -0.0977 
(-0.24) 
0.1250 
(1.13) 
-0.0038 
(-0.09) 
0.0341 
(0.36) 
10.4422*** 
(2.59) 
1.0740 
(1.93) 
0.2294 
(0.44) 
0.5099 
(1.68) 
1.4574*** 
(4.42) 
Spain -0.1435 
(-0.76) 
-0.0130 
(-0.12) 
-0.0158 
(-0.61) 
0.1076 
(1.60) 
-0.1938 
(-0.03) 
-0.2463 
(-0.17) 
0.5374** 
(1.97) 
1.0124 
(0.35) 
2.5093*** 
(3.81) 
Sweden -0.1168 
(-1.54) 
-0.0223 
(-0.38) 
0.0181** 
(2.19) 
-0.0851 
(-1.81) 
-2.1538 
(-0.96) 
-1.3846*** 
(-4.24) 
0.2423 
(1.11) 
-1.0004** 
(-1.99) 
-1.5691*** 
(-5.30) 
Switzerland -0.1108 
(-0.89) 
0.0336 
(0.42) 
-0.0113 
(-0.70) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
2.9873 
(1.17) 
-0.8841*** 
(-3.17) 
0.0240 
(0.18) 
-0.1044 
(-0.23) 
0.1663 
(1.27) 
Turkey 0.3389 
(1.20) 
0.0413 
(0.07) 
0.0525 
(0.44) 
-0.0835 
(-0.38) 
18.6808 
(1.28) 
-1.0483 
(-0.60) 
-0.8919 
(-0.91) 
-0.2088 
(-0.38) 
-0.0282 
(-0.04) 
United States -0.0566 
(-0.81) 
-0.0682 
(-1.39) 
-0.0020 
(-0.14) 
0.0000 
(0.00)   
-4.7373*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.4176*** 
(-5.59) 
0.0132 
(0.05) 
-0.7183 
(-0.75) 
-0.6256*** 
(-2.62) 
Zimbabwe -0.1056 
(-0.38) 
0.0426 
(0.38) 
-0.1402 
(-0.91) 
-0.1079 
(-1.11) 
0.4895 
(0.38) 
-0.2489 
(-0.52) 
0.0158 
(0.08) 
2.3074** 
(2.40) 
0.0956 
(0.24) 
Pooled OLS 
(Levels) 
0.0218 
(0.51) 
0.1947*** 
(5.73) 
-0.0157*** 
(-2.58) 
0.0355 
(0.68) 
0.0156** 
(2.40) 
-0.0537 
(-1.94) 
0.7233*** 
(6.65) 
0.1775** 
(1.92) 
1.2184*** 
(12.13) 
Pooled OLS 
(First Diff.) 
0.0271 
(0.54) 
0.0372 
(1.32) 
0.0015 
(0.27) 
0.0047 
(0.27) 
-0.1309 
(-0.36) 
-0.4125*** 
(-3.62) 
0.1323*** 
(2.91) 
0.1541** 
(2.23) 
0.3164*** 
(3.06) 
Fixed Effects -0.1830*** 
(-3.21) 
0.0805*** 
(2.94) 
-0.0118** 
(-2.55) 
0.0128 
(0.51) 
0.5154*** 
(2.97) 
-0.4245** 
(-5.62) 
0.3958*** 
(6.29) 
0.2840*** 
(3.83) 
0.9020*** 
(9.38) 
MGE -0.0634 
(-1.07) 
-0.0311 
(-0.72) 
4.4513 
(0.82) 
-0.0070 
(-0.44) 
0.4723 
(0.31) 
-0.4663** 
(-2.48) 
0.0540 
(0.65) 
-0.1035 
(-0.29) 
0.1311 
(0.68) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific 
coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% 
respectively. Time dummies are included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. 
Model 2 represents Government Size against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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(B) TRADE OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LCON) 
                 In Table 7, which shows the impact of globalization on government size, as 
measured by LCON, the MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Precisely, Canada, Finland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
US had negative and statistically significant LTRA MGE-coefficients at the 1% level. The 
latter finding for the US, affirms Islam`s (2004) study result. The Netherlands also had a 
negative LTRA MGE-coefficient, with statistical significance at the 5% level.  
                Capturing globalization`s impact on LCON between 1985 and 2005, Table 8 by 
and large affirms Table 7. The MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Country wise, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and 
Sweden had negative and statistically significant MGE-coefficients, at the 1% level. The 
LTRA MGE-coefficient was also negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, for the 
case of Canada, Denmark, and the US. 
                 However, New Zealand had a positive and statistically significant LTRA MGE-
coefficient at the 5% level, while Greece and Japan had a positive and statistically significant 
related MGE-coefficient, at the 1% level. Generally, the “average effect” of LTRA on LCON 
was negative and statistically significant, hence lending credence to the efficiency hypothesis. 
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TABLE 7: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LCON), 1973- 2005 
 MODEL (1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia -0.0145 
(-0.16) 
0.1749*** 
(3.65) 
-0.0394 
(-1.62) 
0.0436** 
(2.26) 
-3.7385*** 
(-3.40) 
-1.6419*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.1299 
(-0.29) 
-0.2609 
(-0.43) 
0.8185 
(1.93) 
Austria -0.3020 
(-1.75) 
0.0414 
(0.57) 
0.0026 
(0.51) 
0.0329 
(0.89) 
-2.9744*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.5545 
(-0.95) 
0.5456** 
(2.14) 
0.0807 
(1.07) 
0.5458*** 
(2.77) 
Belgium -0.1293 
(-1.10) 
0.2209*** 
(3.44) 
0.0512*** 
(4.71) 
-0.1819** 
(-2.14) 
4.5196** 
(2.36) 
0.1656 
(0.35) 
0.3413 
(0.84) 
-0.0686 
(-0.53) 
-0.8819 
(-1.40) 
Canada -0.3462*** 
(-3.85) 
0.1096 
(0.99) 
0.1046*** 
(3.87) 
0.1014 
(1.33) 
3.7254*** 
(3.29) 
-0.5538** 
(-2.31) 
0.2801 
(1.05) 
0.1322 
(0.93) 
-0.7992*** 
(-2.72) 
Denmark -0.0694 
(-0.49) 
0.0255 
(0.38) 
-152.6361 
(-0.81) 
-0.0849*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.8965 
(-0.43) 
-0.7294 
(-0.33) 
0.0436 
(0.10) 
0.4475 
(1.55) 
0.2397 
(0.75) 
Finland -0.4616*** 
(-5.06) 
0.0270 
(0.46) 
-0.0000 
(-0.00) 
-0.0319 
(-0.63) 
-2.4795 
(-0.46) 
-1.11702*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.0397 
(-0.16) 
0.1367 
(0.86) 
-1.3619*** 
(-6.69) 
France 0.1394 
(1.36) 
-0.2280*** 
(-2.92) 
0.0192*** 
(3.09) 
-0.0215 
(-0.66) 
-4.6740 
(-1.36) 
-0.7860** 
(-2.26) 
1.6647*** 
(5.05) 
0.0743 
(0.63) 
0.9329*** 
(3.61) 
Germany -0.0259 
(-0.49) 
-0.07375** 
(-2.11) 
-14.5418 
(-1.93) 
-0.0730 
(-0.45) 
-1.3154** 
(-2.47) 
-0.4827*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.0288 
(-0.45) 
0.6129 
(1.92) 
0.4067** 
(2.55) 
Greece 0.2657 
(1.27) 
0.3535 
(1.92) 
-0.0372 
(-0.82) 
-0.0991 
(-0.69) 
5.0533 
(1.79) 
-0.2865 
(-0.67) 
-0.1082 
(-0.41) 
0.0048 
(0.02) 
-0.4673** 
(-2.40) 
Ireland 0.1292 
(0.90) 
-0.1441** 
(-1.97) 
0.0258 
(1.93) 
0.0736 
(1.44) 
1.5201*** 
(2.68) 
0.1645 
(0.56) 
1.1193*** 
(3.94) 
-0.8964*** 
(-3.03) 
0.4145 
(1.29) 
Italy -0.3676*** 
(-4.25) 
0.1080 
(1.43) 
0.2045 
(0.28) 
0.0705 
(1.69) 
5.1253*** 
(2.64) 
0.6760** 
(1.96) 
-0.1674 
(-0.44) 
-0.1902 
(-1.54) 
-0.56062 
(-1.46) 
Jamaica -0.0505 
(-0.39) 
-0.3052*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.1683** 
(-2.03) 
-0.0126 
(-0.19) 
-5.1753*** 
(-3.21) 
-1.4264*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.0483 
(-0.38) 
0.4722*** 
(3.51) 
0.9020 
(1.87) 
Japan 0.0393 
(1.43) 
-0.0565** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0064 
(-0.43) 
-0.0828** 
(-2.05) 
2.0642*** 
(4.33) 
-0.8102*** 
(-6.66) 
0.0161 
(0.31) 
0.0735 
(0.51) 
0.1592 
(1.17) 
Korea -0.1436 
(-0.94) 
-0.2213** 
(-2.28) 
0.0472 
(0.49) 
0.0703 
(0.98) 
2.2942*** 
(2.87) 
-1.8579*** 
(-4.70) 
0.2551** 
(2.09) 
0.0206 
(0.11) 
0.2385 
(1.34) 
Mexico -0.0839 
(-0.67) 
0.0184 
(0.19) 
-0.0559 
(0.19) 
0.0703 
(0.98) 
-1.6444 
(-1.53) 
-0.7934** 
(2.27) 
0.3984 
(1.85) 
0.0704 
(0.22) 
1.1568** 
(2.90) 
Netherlands -0.2453** 
(-2.53) 
0.1333*** 
(3.72) 
-0.4238 
(-1.17) 
-0.0182 
(-0.78) 
3.2923 
(1.13) 
-1.0456*** 
(-4.80) 
0.3697** 
(1.98) 
0.1974 
(2.01) 
0.0398 
(0.15) 
New Zealand 0.1439 
(1.07) 
-0.0887 
(-1.00) 
-0.0097 
(-0.36) 
-0.1056 
(-1.57) 
-0.6650 
(-0.81) 
-1.1126*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.9010** 
(-2.10) 
0.5301** 
(2.01) 
0.2859 
(0.80) 
Norway -0.5371*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.0181 
(-0.19) 
0.0256 
(0.85) 
-0.0365 
(-0.62) 
-3.1993 
(-0.53) 
-0.0952 
(-0.28) 
0.0173 
(0.07) 
-0.6709 
(-2.08) 
-0.4875 
(-0.81) 
Portugal 0.0197 
(0.30) 
-0.0827*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.0139 
(-0.61) 
-0.0872*** 
(-2.77) 
-1.2064** 
(-2.39) 
-0.2910 
(-1.68) 
0.2010 
(1.48) 
0.1330 
(0.85) 
0.3789*** 
(2.64) 
Spain -0.1019 
(-0.96) 
-0.1108** 
(-2.10) 
0.0089 
(1.15) 
0.0375 
(0.78) 
0.4299 
(0.50) 
-1.3120*** 
(-4.44) 
0.5810*** 
(3.51) 
0.1807 
(1.51) 
1.0801*** 
(3.47) 
Sweden 0.0408 
(0.30) 
-0.2579** 
(-2.44) 
0.0196 
(1.03) 
-0.1114 
(-1.79) 
-6.1297*** 
(-2.67) 
-1.5761*** 
(-4.16) 
0.0797 
(0.17) 
0.4036 
(0.44) 
-1.9780*** 
(-3.61) 
Switzerland -0.3363*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.1004*** 
(-2.71) 
0.0056 
(0.36) 
-0.0363 
(-0.80) 
-1.0342 
(-1.38) 
0.3380** 
(2.43) 
0.2336** 
(2.43) 
-0.0741 
(-0.39) 
0.4355 
(1.51) 
Turkey -0.0939 
(-0.76) 
0.1368 
(0.42) 
0.0553 
(0.75) 
0.3457*** 
(3.02) 
-6.3513** 
(-1.96) 
0.2139 
(0.22) 
  0.5451 
(1.40) 
-0.3715 
(-1.03) 
0.6042 
(1.10) 
United States -0.1936*** 
(-2.80) 
0.0697 
(0.77) 
-0.0662** 
(-2.28) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-7.6664*** 
(-4.96) 
-0.7742*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.0458 
(-0.11) 
-0.0821 
(-0.65) 
-0.6848*** 
(-3.06) 
Zimbabwe -0.0139 
(-0.05) 
0.0612 
(0.55) 
-0.3192** 
(-2.41) 
-0.3094** 
(-2.05) 
-0.5073 
(-0.46) 
-1.1906** 
(-2.28) 
-0.0145 
(-0.11) 
0.0284 
(0.02) 
-0.9057** 
(-2.39) 
Pooled OLS 
(Levels) 
0.2032*** 
(7.48) 
-0.1080*** 
(-5.03) 
-0.0164*** 
(-3.69) 
0.0072 
(0.27) 
0.0240*** 
(5.83) 
-0.0343 
(-1.95) 
0.0883** 
(2.22) 
0.5418*** 
(11.56) 
0.8785*** 
(15.46) 
Pooled OLS 
(First Diff.) 
-0.1366*** 
(-4.14) 
0.0334 
(1.66) 
0.0022 
(0.46) 
-0.0096 
(-0.78) 
-0.1222 
(-0.55) 
-0.5908*** 
(-7.60) 
-0.0669 
(-1.95) 
0.0008 
(0.94) 
0.1899 
(1.88) 
Fixed Effects -0.1726*** 
(-6.68) 
0.0358*** 
(2.71) 
-0.0129*** 
(-4.30) 
0.0360*** 
(2.93) 
0.0643 
(0.98) 
-0.1968*** 
(-6.39) 
0.1173*** 
(5.28) 
0.4163*** 
(12.52) 
0.6757*** 
(12.86) 
MGE -0.1095*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0083 
(-0.26) 
-6.7099 
(-1.10) 
-0.018 
(-0.75) 
-0.8653 
(-1.18) 
-0.6117*** 
(-4.19) 
0.2083** 
(2.19) 
0.0394 
(0.57) 
0.0205 
(0.13) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific 
coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% 
respectively. Time dummies are included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. 
Model 2 represents Government Size against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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TABLE 8: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LCON), 1985- 2005 
 MODEL (1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia -0.1383 
(-1.63) 
0.1000** 
(2.19) 
-0.0493** 
(-2.53) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-4.4929*** 
(-4.96) 
-1.7969*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.2893 
(-0.81) 
0.5535 
(1.01) 
-0.1640 
(-0.70) 
Austria -0.5863 
(-1.86) 
0.0047 
(0.05) 
-0.0061 
(-1.14) 
-0.0460 
(-1.18) 
1.8672 
(0.91) 
0.9038 
(0.93) 
0.0431 
(0.17) 
-1.5928 
(-0.78) 
1.1352*** 
(3.41) 
Belgium -0.1928 
(-1.53) 
0.0529 
(0.94) 
0.0603*** 
(5.85) 
-0.1140 
(-1.78) 
-5.8195** 
(-2.33) 
-0.6122 
(-1.09) 
0.6764** 
(2.40) 
-1.7312*** 
(-5.13) 
-0.6374 
(-1.93) 
Canada -0.4730** 
(-2.24) 
0.3401 
(1.11) 
0.1140 
(1.82) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
6.2027** 
(2.37) 
0.1417 
(0.25) 
1.1037 
(1.82) 
-0.5163 
(-0.22) 
-1.7801*** 
(-5.20) 
Denmark -0.1393** 
(-2.43) 
0.0259 
(0.84) 
-55.5738 
(-0.76) 
-0.0519*** 
(-2.89) 
0.7508 
(0.43) 
-1.8949 
(-1.04) 
-0.3740 
(-1.74) 
0.5316** 
(2.11) 
-0.0668 
(-0.54) 
Finland -0.4138*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.1079 
(-0.98) 
-0.0074 
(-0.84) 
-0.1473 
(-1.52) 
-20.1209 
(-1.17) 
-1.8803** 
(-2.34) 
-0.0952 
(-0.27) 
0.0816 
(0.41) 
-0.8291*** 
(-3.54) 
France 0.0059 
(0.09) 
-0.0145 
(-0.32) 
-0.0050 
(-1.76) 
0.0477** 
(1.96) 
-1.8114 
(-0.99) 
-1.1387*** 
(-6.34) 
0.5549** 
(2.22) 
-0.7947 
(-1.83) 
0.7758*** 
(4.09) 
Germany -0.0820 
(-1.44) 
0.0152 
(0.42) 
-130.5725 
(-1.63) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.4516 
(-0.49) 
-0.5909*** 
(-3.47) 
0.0061 
(0.12) 
0.4404 
(1.83) 
0.1831** 
(2.05) 
Greece 0.8362*** 
(2.85) 
0.1593 
(0.88) 
-0.0267 
(-0.91) 
0.0724 
(0.69) 
0.6284 
(0.12) 
0.2133 
(0.46) 
-0.2453 
(-1.81) 
0.4519** 
(2.19) 
-0.2651 
(-0.78) 
Ireland 0.1003 
(0.79) 
-0.1155 
(-1.72) 
0.0154 
(1.87) 
0.1127 
(1.73) 
0.9695 
(1.90) 
0.4275 
(1.76) 
1.1652*** 
(6.29) 
-3.0258*** 
(-3.88) 
1.0181*** 
(2.60) 
Italy -0.1271 
(-0.99) 
-0.1437 
(-1.01) 
0.4457 
(0.73) 
-0.1701 
(-1.65) 
5.0398 
(1.68) 
0.7622 
(0.86) 
1.0764** 
(2.07) 
0.1889 
(0.93) 
-0.0808 
(-0.25) 
Jamaica 0.0738 
(0.27) 
-0.1307 
(-0.81) 
-0.1125 
(-1.21) 
-0.1315 
(-1.31) 
1.9451 
(0.28) 
-0.6929 
(-1.06) 
-0.1810 
(-1.09) 
0.3334 
(1.53) 
0.0038 
(0.01) 
Japan 0.0785*** 
(2.97) 
-0.0984*** 
(-6.58) 
-0.0068 
(-1.02) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
8.7173*** 
(4.33) 
-1.0357*** 
(-10.75) 
0.0098 
(0.38) 
-0.2600*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0142 
(-0.12) 
Korea -0.1141 
(-1.36) 
-0.0327 
(-0.43) 
-0.0624 
(-1.14) 
0.0181 
(0.37) 
-0.5123 
(-0.24) 
-0.7735** 
(-2.06) 
-0.1599 
(-1.62) 
0.1569 
(1.29) 
0.0145 
(0.06) 
Mexico -0.4513*** 
(-2.84) 
0.0951 
(0.89) 
0.0728 
(0.93) 
-0.1070 
(-1.87) 
7.1905** 
(2.01) 
0.1284 
(0.27) 
0.2387 
(1.49) 
1.8931*** 
(3.61) 
1.3375*** 
(3.37) 
Netherlands -0.0854 
(-1.08) 
0.1008*** 
(3.63) 
-0.2694 
(-1.29) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
4.9400*** 
(2.59) 
-1.6622*** 
(-8.87) 
-0.1908 
(-0.86) 
0.4247 
(0.81) 
-0.4006 
(-0.86) 
New Zealand 0.2166** 
(2.01) 
-0.0158 
(-0.26) 
-0.0025 
(-0.15) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.4917 
(0.96) 
-0.4682 
(-1.30) 
-0.8124*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.3934 
(-0.95) 
-0.7383*** 
(-3.48) 
Norway -0.7840*** 
(-3.51) 
0.0216 
(0.20) 
-0.0200 
(-0.66) 
-0.1297 
(-1.28) 
-28.2838*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.6099 
(-1.21) 
0.0755 
(0.21) 
0.4972 
(0.43) 
-0.0239 
(-0.03) 
Portugal -0.2237 
(-1.02) 
0.0097 
(0.16) 
-0.0146 
(-0.65) 
-0.0659 
(-1.30) 
-0.6904 
(-0.32) 
0.1398 
(0.47) 
0.0415 
(0.15) 
0.2798 
(1.74) 
0.2235 
(0.84) 
Spain -0.2998*** 
(-3.13) 
0.0044 
(0.08) 
-0.0185 
(-1.40) 
0.0482 
(1.41) 
5.0962 
(1.66) 
0.7007 
(0.93) 
0.4398*** 
(3.16) 
2.1007 
(1.44) 
2.3086*** 
(5.03) 
Sweden -0.2351*** 
(-4.56) 
0.0551 
(1.37) 
0.0125** 
(2.23) 
-0.1296*** 
(-4.08) 
-3.6115** 
(-2.37) 
-0.8062*** 
(-3.65) 
0.0143 
(0.10) 
0.0811 
(0.24) 
-0.9921*** 
(-3.42) 
Switzerland -0.0756 
(-0.50) 
-0.1827 
(-1.92) 
0.0010 
(0.05) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-1.6519 
(-0.54) 
0.0349 
(0.10) 
0.3255** 
(1.99) 
-0.3223 
(-0.60) 
-0.3174 
(-1.60) 
Turkey -0.0745 
(-0.37) 
-0.4616 
(-1.08) 
0.0700 
(0.82) 
0.0833 
(0.53) 
16.4478 
(1.56) 
-1.3054 
(-1.04) 
-0.4474 
(-0.63) 
-0.1488 
(-0.37) 
-1.0643 
(-1.72) 
United States -0.33813** 
(-2.38) 
0.0255 
(0.26) 
-0.0216 
(-0.76) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-10.565*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.6873 
(-1.33) 
0.4882 
(0.90) 
-3.2435 
(-1.67) 
-2.5601*** 
(-3.70) 
Zimbabwe    0.1768 
(0.25) 
0.0748 
(0.26) 
-0.2281 
(-0.58) 
-0.3290 
(-1.33) 
-0.1948 
(-0.06) 
-1.7264 
(-1.42) 
-0.38045 
(-0.76) 
0.7605 
(0.31) 
-0.5876 
(-1.05) 
Pooled OLS 
(Levels) 
0.1552*** 
(  4.48) 
-0.0430 
(-1.56) 
-0.0151*** 
( -3.06) 
0.0453 
(1.07) 
0.0213*** 
(4.04) 
-0.0203 
(-0.91) 
0.1970** 
(2.24) 
0.4198*** 
(5.62) 
0.8807*** 
(11.11) 
Pooled OLS 
(First Diff.) 
-0.1212** 
(-2.39) 
0.0205 
(0.72) 
0.0027 
(0.50) 
-0.0172 
(-0.98) 
-0.2110 
(-0.58) 
-0.6176*** 
(-5.39) 
-0.0964** 
(-2.11) 
0.1250 
(1.80) 
-0.1252 
(-1.25) 
Fixed Effects -0.1126*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0335 
(-1.81) 
-0.0058 
(-1.85) 
0.0303 
(1.79) 
-0.0031 
(-0.03) 
-0.2443*** 
(-4.79) 
-0.0064 
(-0.15) 
0.3952*** 
(7.90) 
0.4304*** 
(6.23) 
MGE -0.1339** 
(-2.14) 
-0.0087 
(-0.30) 
-7.4482 
(-1.33) 
-0.0416** 
(-2.12) 
-0.7168 
(-0.40) 
-0.5692*** 
(-3.31) 
0.1233 
(1.22) 
-0.1301 
(-0.53) 
-0.1409 
(-0.71) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific coefficients, 
the numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% respectively. Time 
dummies are included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. Model 2 
represents Government Size against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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(C)  TRADE OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LTAX) 
                 In Table 9, which displays globalization`s effect on government size, as measured 
by LTAX, the MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was negative, though statistically 
insignificant. Country wise, Germany had a negative and statistically significant LTRA 
MGE-coefficient, at the 1% level, while Korea, Mexico, and New Zealand also had a 
negative LTRA MGE-coefficient, with statistical significance at the 5% level.                   
Only the US had a positive and statistically significant LTRA MGE-coefficient, at the 1% 
level. In Table 10, the MGE panel coefficient for LTRA was negative, though statistically 
insignificant. Both Greece and the US had positive and statistically significant LTRA MGE-
coefficients, at the 5% level.  
                 The US case affirms Howard (2007) and Kling (2010) `s submission that while 
most European states rely heavily on social insurance programs, the US addresses social 
needs differently. It uses more of tax expenditures, social regulation, loan guarantees, and 
less of social insurance. “For example, one of the tools used in America for income 
redistribution is the earned Income Tax Credit, which is a rebate given to low-income 
taxpayers. The EITC can and often does exceed the tax payments made by individuals, so 
that it operates like a negative income tax. Howard (2007) points out that the EITC grew 
faster than any other social program from 1980 to 2000” (Kling 2010). So the “average effect” 
of LTRA on LTAX though negative was not statistically significant, hence weakly 
supporting the efficiency hypothesis.  
                 In a nutshell, employing LEXP and LTAX to represent government size, the 
“average effect” of LTRA on them though tenuous was negative. Conversely, when LCON 
was invoked as a government size proxy, the “average effect” of LTRA on it was negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 9: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LTAX), 1973- 2005 
 MODEL (1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia 0.0584 
(0.69) 
0.0105 
(0.24) 
0.0367 
(1.67) 
0.0247 
(1.42) 
-3.7063*** 
(-3.73) 
1.2357*** 
(3.17) 
-0.1225 
(-0.30) 
-0.0849 
(-0.16) 
0.8301*** 
(2.98) 
Austria 0.0029 
(0.03) 
-0.0182 
(0.44) 
-0.0067** 
(-2.26) 
0.0326 
(1.53) 
-2.5917*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.5059 
(-1.50) 
0.4586*** 
(3.11) 
0.0485 
(1.12) 
0.4088*** 
(3.51) 
Belgium 0.0211 
(0.34) 
-0.0640 
(-1.91) 
0.0270*** 
(4.76) 
-0.0605 
(-1.36) 
-2.3558** 
(-2.35) 
-0.7240*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.4454 
(-2.09) 
0.0962 
(1.42) 
-0.1878 
(-0.54) 
Canada 0.0921 
(1.00) 
0.1147 
(1.01) 
-0.0310 
(-1.12) 
0.1238 
(1.59) 
4.7928*** 
(4.14) 
-0.2541 
(-1.03) 
-1.0195*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.3881*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.4441 
(-1.79) 
Denmark 0.0024 
(0.02) 
-0.0592 
(-1.21) 
238.6099 
(1.76) 
-0.0438** 
(-2.06) 
-3.2062** 
(-2.11) 
3.9415** 
(2.49) 
-0.2321 
(-0.72) 
-0.0136 
(-0.06) 
-0.0472 
(-0.25) 
Finland -0.0977 
(-1.02) 
-0.1186 
(-1.93) 
-0.0043 
(-0.63) 
0.0295 
(0.56) 
-2.1254 
(-0.38) 
-0.6902** 
(-2.25) 
-0.3485 
(-1.38) 
0.0823 
(0.49) 
-0.1786 
(-0.88) 
France 0.1213 
(1.54) 
-0.1393** 
(-2.32) 
0.0201*** 
(4.18) 
-0.0104 
(-0.41) 
-8.3543*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.4466 
(-1.66) 
0.6764*** 
(2.66) 
0.1203 
(3.47) 
0.9557*** 
(5.00) 
Germany -0.1280*** 
(-4.01) 
0.0005 
(0.02) 
-12.7333*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.3711*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.3231 
(-1.01) 
0.4190*** 
(4.48) 
0.0131 
(0.34) 
0.8110*** 
(4.22) 
0.3318*** 
(3.35) 
Greece -0.1410 
(-1.08) 
0.2542** 
(2.21) 
-0.0388 
(-1.36) 
-0.1312 
(-1.47) 
4.4127** 
(2.49) 
-0.4907 
(-1.83) 
0.0365 
(0.22) 
0.0551 
(0.28) 
0.1165 
(0.87) 
Ireland -0.0329 
(-0.23) 
-0.0022 
(-0.03) 
-0.0280** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0207 
(-0.40) 
1.1753** 
(2.07) 
-1.1841*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.2616 
(-0.92) 
0.0748 
(0.25) 
0.3085 
(1.24) 
Italy -0.0314 
(-0.35) 
-0.0860 
(-1.10) 
0.0073 
(0.01) 
0.1982*** 
(4.57) 
-0.6422 
(-0.32) 
0.8608** 
(2.41) 
0.4611 
(1.17) 
-0.0280 
(-0.22) 
-0.4356 
(-0.91) 
Jamaica 0.0101 
(1.15) 
-0.0104 
(-1.84) 
0.0031 
(0.50) 
-0.0028 
(-0.55) 
0.2857** 
(2.38) 
0.0096 
(0.41) 
-0.0169 
(-1.81) 
0.0276*** 
(2.75) 
0.0272 
(1.14) 
Japan -0.0354 
(-0.67) 
0.0943 
(1.94) 
-0.0375 
(-1.32) 
0.2267*** 
(2.93) 
1.2081 
(1.32) 
0.1162 
(0.50) 
-0.1656 
(-1.66) 
-0.0483 
(-0.18) 
-0.8935*** 
(-3.07) 
Korea -0.3861** 
(-2.11) 
-0.1509 
(-1.30) 
0.2185 
(1.91) 
0.0995 
(1.16) 
2.0506** 
(  2.15) 
-1.2059** 
(-2.55) 
0.4463*** 
(3.06) 
-0.0434 
(-0.20) 
0.3773 
(1.66) 
Mexico -0.1129** 
(-2.29) 
0.0013 
(0.03) 
0.0087 
(0.32) 
-0.0227 
(-0.80) 
-0.2284 
(-0.54) 
-0.1184 
(-0.86) 
0.0085 
(0.10) 
-0.2695** 
(-2.15) 
-0.3537** 
(-2.24) 
Netherlands -0.2389 
(-1.52) 
-0.1447** 
(-2.50) 
0.4484 
(0.77) 
0.0745** 
(1.98) 
-1.8756 
(-0.40) 
0.0539 
(0.15) 
-0.3432 
(-1.14) 
0.2410 
(1.57) 
0.2900 
(0.73) 
New Zealand -0.3208** 
(-2.31) 
-0.0207 
(-0.23) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.0157 
(0.23) 
-1.9065** 
(-2.26) 
-0.4865 
(-1.14) 
0.2561 
(0.57) 
0.0630   
(0.23) 
-0.2935 
(-0.94) 
Norway 0.0374 
(0.45) 
0.1309*** 
(3.18) 
-0.0123 
(-0.93) 
0.0622** 
(2.40) 
-4.3615 
(-1.63) 
0.3933*** 
(2.60) 
0.2801** 
(2.55) 
-0.1707 
(-1.20) 
-0.1365 
(-0.43) 
Portugal 0.1170 
(1.30) 
-0.1252*** 
(-3.14) 
0.0105 
(0.33) 
-0.0252 
(-0.58) 
1.3184 
(1.89) 
0.0768 
(0.32) 
0.3874** 
(1.98) 
-0.2271 
(-1.05) 
0.1264 
(0.69) 
Spain -0.1498 
(-1.47) 
-0.0704 
(-1.38) 
0.0405*** 
(5.43) 
0.0619 
(1.33) 
-3.3574*** 
(-4.04) 
-1.5818*** 
(-5.56) 
0.2435 
(1.53) 
-0.0053 
(-0.05) 
0.8770 
(1.88) 
Sweden -0.0395 
(-0.25) 
-0.1798 
(-1.47) 
-0.0319 
(-1.45) 
-0.0006 
(-0.01) 
-5.0828 
(-1.91) 
-0.7180 
(-1.64) 
-1.0210 
(-1.86) 
0.0546 
(0.05) 
0.2139  
(0.32) 
Switzerland 0.2108 
(1.31) 
-0.0778 
(-0.97) 
-0.0144 
(-0.43) 
-0.2072** 
(-2.13) 
-3.6137** 
(-2.24) 
-0.8913*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.0079 
(-0.04) 
0.3446 
(0.85) 
0.1844 
(0.68) 
Turkey -0.0515 
(-0.41) 
0.4676 
(1.40) 
0.0164 
(0.22) 
0.1764 
(1.52) 
-7.3080** 
(-2.22) 
0.4285 
(0.43) 
0.1686 
(0.42) 
-0.0145 
(-0.04) 
0.2279 
(0.70) 
United States 0.3433*** 
(4.28) 
0.0169 
(0.16) 
0.0558 
(1.65) 
              0.0000 
(0.00) 
6.6590*** 
(3.71) 
-0.2401 
(-0.97) 
-0.9111** 
(-1.96) 
0.5674*** 
(3.86) 
1.1592*** 
(4.10) 
Zimbabwe 0.0168 
(0.21) 
0.0382 
(1.13) 
-0.0895** 
(-2.24) 
-0.1161** 
(-2.55) 
-0.7356** 
(-2.22) 
0.1268 
(0.80) 
-0.0466 
(-1.18) 
0.2012 
(0.47) 
-0.2840*** 
(-2.93) 
Pooled OLS 
(Levels) 
0.3040*** 
(11.82) 
-0.1719*** 
(-8.41) 
-0.0206*** 
(-4.85) 
0.0089 
(0.34) 
0.0183*** 
(4.68) 
0.1209*** 
(7.21) 
0.2399*** 
(6.33) 
0.4649*** 
(10.41) 
0.9733*** 
(16.33) 
Pooled OLS 
(First Diff.) 
-0.0538** 
(-2.35) 
-0.0087 
(-0.62) 
0.0017 
(0.50) 
0.0092 
(1.08) 
0.3660** 
(2.35) 
-0.1541*** 
(-2.85) 
0.0070 
(0.29) 
0.0005 
(0.83) 
0.0082 
(0.15) 
Fixed Effects -0.0589** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0918*** 
(-7.28) 
-0.0081*** 
(-2.80) 
0.0848*** 
(7.19) 
0.1575** 
(2.51) 
-0.2204*** 
(-7.47) 
0.1924*** 
(9.05) 
0.2733*** 
(  8.58) 
0.7854*** 
(16.13) 
MGE -0.0293 
(-0.94) 
-0.0056 
(-0.20) 
9.0590 
(0.95) 
0.0045 
(0.18) 
-1.1949 
(-1.69) 
-0.0751 
(-0.35) 
-0.0602 
(-0.67) 
0.0601 
(1.21) 
0.1272 
(1.31) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific 
coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% 
respectively. Time dummies are included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. 
Model 2 represents Government Size against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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TABLE 10: EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON GOVERNMENT SIZE (LTAX), 1985- 2005 
 MODEL(1) MODEL (2) 
COUNTRY LTRA LFOP LTAR LINCAP LPOP LRYC LPGLO LSGLO LGLO 
Australia 0.0969 
(0.99) 
0.0338 
(0.64) 
0.0398 
(1.76) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-3.4712*** 
(-3.31) 
1.2840*** 
(3.21) 
-0.0728 
(-0.18) 
-0.3386 
(-0.53) 
0.2930 
(1.36) 
Austria -0.0368 
(-0.13) 
0.0681 
(0.88) 
-0.0094** 
(-1.97) 
0.0063 
(0.18) 
0.7319 
(0.40) 
0.2446 
(0.29) 
0.1282 
(0.56) 
1.1747 
(0.65) 
1.6056*** 
(5.23) 
Belgium -0.0643 
(-0.47) 
0.0348 
(0.56) 
0.0266** 
(2.36) 
-0.0910 
(-1.30) 
-3.9230 
(-1.44) 
-0.3074 
(-0.50) 
-0.1423 
(-0.46) 
0.1463 
(0.40) 
-0.0663 
(-0.31) 
Canada -0.0435 
(-0.31) 
-0.0192 
(-0.09) 
-0.0943 
(-2.27) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
5.1246*** 
(2.96) 
0.1679 
(0.45) 
0.0056 
(0.01) 
0.9559 
(0.60) 
0.8530*** 
(4.09) 
Denmark -0.0784 
(-0.79) 
-0.1218** 
(-2.31) 
89.7375 
(0.71) 
-0.0711** 
(-2.30) 
-1.5708 
(-0.53) 
2.0926 
(0.66) 
-0.7047 
(-1.90) 
0.1341 
(0.31) 
-0.2194 
(-1.00) 
Finland -0.2195 
(-1.88) 
0.0015 
(0.01) 
0.0042 
(0.51) 
-0.0316 
(-0.35) 
22.9573 
(1.44) 
0.4439 
(0.60) 
-0.0723 
(-0.22) 
0.0475 
(0.26) 
-0.4107** 
(-2.44) 
France  0.0192 
(0.32) 
0.003942 
(0.09) 
0.0047 
(1.77) 
0.0105 
(0.47) 
-6.6108*** 
(-3.94) 
-0.7024*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.0328 
(-0.14) 
-0.3663 
(-0.92) 
-0.1184 
(-0.60) 
Germany -0.0992 
(-1.51) 
0.0138 
(0.33) 
-54.8897 
(-0.60) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.7124 
(0.67) 
0.2275 
(1.16) 
0.0058 
(0.10) 
0.7578*** 
(2.73) 
0.3508*** 
(3.53) 
Greece 0.7187** 
(2.21) 
0.0623 
(0.31) 
-0.0224 
(-0.69) 
-0.0120 
(-0.10) 
1.0976 
(0.19) 
-0.7422 
(-1.43) 
0.0392 
(0.26) 
0.2408 
(1.05) 
-0.0957 
(-0.29) 
Ireland -0.1666 
(-0.55) 
-0.0114 
(-0.07) 
-0.0020 
(-0.10) 
-0.1065 
(-0.69) 
0.2438 
(0.20) 
-1.1684** 
(-2.03) 
0.0221 
(0.05) 
2.6553 
(1.44) 
0.2254 
(0.58) 
Italy -0.2808*** 
(-2.75) 
0.1620 
(1.43) 
-0.3147 
(-0.64) 
0.2876*** 
(3.48) 
-0.14738 
(-0.06) 
0.5601 
(0.79) 
-0.2556 
(-0.61) 
-0.0033 
(-0.02) 
0.7998** 
(2.40) 
Jamaica 0.0053 
(0.21) 
0.0055 
(0.37) 
-0.0023 
(-0.26) 
-0.0064 
(-0.69) 
0.2038 
(0.31) 
0.0888 
(1.46) 
-0.0296 
(-1.92) 
0.0351 
(1.73) 
-0.0062 
(-0.20) 
Japan -0.0630 
(-0.77) 
0.1503*** 
(3.24) 
-0.0427 
(-2.07) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-3.9411 
(-0.63) 
0.2742 
(0.92) 
-0.1249 
(-1.56) 
0.3019 
(1.04) 
-0.5893** 
(-2.34) 
Korea -0.3806*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.0736 
(-0.75) 
-0.0056 
(-0.08) 
-0.0335 
(-0.54) 
6.8059** 
(2.47) 
-0.5736 
(-1.19) 
-0.1524 
(-1.20) 
-0.1777 
(-1.14) 
-0.3879 
(-1.35) 
Mexico -0.0944 
(-0.85) 
-0.0141 
(-0.19) 
-0.0720 
(-1.31) 
-0.0145 
(-0.36) 
-1.0735 
(-0.43) 
0.4535 
(1.35) 
0.0381 
(0.34) 
-0.2919 
(-0.80) 
-0.0589 
(-0.28) 
Netherlands -0.2843 
(-1.17) 
-0.1144 
(-1.35) 
0.4776 
(0.75) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-1.7824 
(-0.31) 
0.4535 
(0.79) 
0.0771 
(0.11) 
-0.1020 
(-0.06) 
-0.8405 
(-0.92) 
New Zealand -0.1642 
(-1.13) 
-0.0784 
(-0.96) 
0.0463** 
(2.09) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-1.7466** 
(-2.53) 
1.1169** 
(2.31) 
1.2873*** 
(3.21) 
-2.1754*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.6832 
(-1.66) 
Norway -0.2186 
(-1.84) 
0.0335 
(0.58) 
-0.0197 
(-1.21) 
-0.08474 
(-1.57) 
-0.1631 
(-0.05) 
0.7253*** 
(2.71) 
-0.1028 
(-0.54) 
-0.8592 
(-1.39) 
-0.2845 
(-0.83) 
Portugal -0.2513 
(-1.46) 
0.0164 
(0.36) 
-0.0077 
(-0.43) 
0.01901 
(0.48) 
-1.2948 
(-0.77) 
0.4013 
(1.73) 
-0.0082 
(-0.04) 
0.0024 
(0.02) 
0.1468 
(0.89) 
Spain -0.0568 
(-0.71) 
-0.1126** 
(-2.39) 
0.0097 
(0.88) 
0.0834*** 
(2.92) 
2.9671 
(1.16) 
0.5882 
(0.94) 
0.2535** 
(2.19) 
1.8815 
(1.55) 
0.8059** 
(2.16) 
Sweden -0.0557 
(-0.67) 
0.0140 
(0.22) 
-0.0235*** 
(-2.60) 
0.1257** 
(2.45) 
5.7669** 
(2.34) 
1.1551*** 
(3.24) 
-0.3197 
(-1.34) 
1.5594*** 
(2.83) 
1.2442*** 
(2.80) 
Switzerland -0.1390 
(-0.78) 
0.1356 
(1.20) 
0.0026 
(0.11) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
1.9044 
(0.53) 
-0.2157 
(-0.54) 
-0.2821 
(-1.45) 
1.2892** 
(2.03) 
0.5321** 
(2.44) 
Turkey -0.1316 
(-1.38) 
0.2192 
(1.10) 
-0.0388 
(-0.97) 
-0.0387 
(-0.53) 
16.9495*** 
(3.43) 
0.0867 
(0.15) 
-0.7815** 
(-2.36) 
-0.1528 
(-0.82) 
-0.5495 
(-1.63) 
United States 0.4282** 
(2.51) 
-0.0008 
(-0.01) 
0.0260 
(0.76) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
6.1851 
(1.88) 
0.4338 
(0.70) 
-0.7688 
(-1.18) 
4.7695** 
(2.04) 
3.2354*** 
(3.47) 
Zimbabwe 0.1692 
(1.02) 
0.0383 
(0.57) 
-0.0285 
(-0.31) 
-0.1278** 
(-2.20) 
-0.6174 
(-0.79) 
-0.3846 
(-1.35) 
-0.3007*** 
(-2.58) 
0.5485 
(0.95) 
-0.3064** 
(-2.01) 
Pooled OLS 
(Levels) 
0.2210*** 
(6.81) 
-0.0464 
(-1.80) 
-0.0154*** 
(-3.32) 
0.0741 
(1.88) 
0.0167*** 
(3.40) 
0.0769*** 
(3.67) 
0.4541*** 
(5.52) 
0.3473*** 
(4.97) 
1.1089*** 
(14.21) 
Pooled OLS 
(First Diff.) 
-0.0600** 
(-2.04) 
-0.0102 
(-0.62) 
0.0013 
(0.40) 
0.0064 
(0.63) 
0.4496** 
(2.13) 
-0.0867 
(-1.30) 
-0.0240 
(-0.90) 
0.1356*** 
(3.35) 
0.0392 
(0.66) 
Fixed Effects -0.0960*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0523*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.0041 
(-1.47) 
0.0845*** 
(5.53) 
0.4800*** 
(4.56) 
-0.1235*** 
(-2.69) 
0.1164*** 
(3.04) 
0.2972*** 
(6.60) 
0.7663*** 
(12.88) 
MGE -0.0556 
(-1.21) 
0.0178671 
(1.05) 
1.3921 
(0.32) 
-0.0034 
(-0.21) 
1.8123 
(1.41) 
0.2682 
(1.88) 
-0.0918 
(-1.18) 
0.4813 
(1.84) 
0.2190 
(1.25) 
Notes: For the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, while for the MGE country specific 
coefficients, the numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. In all cases *** and ** indicate statistical significance at levels 1% and 5% 
respectively. Time dummies are included for both OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, while a time trend is included in the MGE regression. 
Model 2 represents Government Size against the Overall Globalization Index, while controlling for LPOP and LRYC. 
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(D)     FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LEXP) 
                 In Table 5, the panel FOP MGE-coefficient was negative, albeit statistically 
insignificant. Country wise, France, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden had negative Financial 
Openness MGE-coefficients, and statistically significant at the 1% level. More so, Austria 
and Italy had negative FOP MGE-coefficients, but statistically significant at the 5% level. 
However, for the case of Belgium and Mexico, the FOP MGE-coefficients were positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the FOP MGE-coefficient for Zimbabwe was 
also positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In Table 6, the panel FOP MGE-
coefficient was negative, but statistically insignificant. Country wise, both Austria and 
Denmark exhibited negative and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficients at the 1% 
level. Only Mexico had a positive and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficient, at the 1% 
level, while Japan`s was positive, with statistical significance at the 5% level.  
 
    (E)     FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LCON) 
 
                 In Table 7, the FOP panel MGE-coefficient was negative, but statistically 
insignificant. Country-wise, France, Jamaica, Portugal, and Switzerland their FOP MGE-
coefficients were negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The latter coefficients 
were negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, for Germany, Japan, Korea, Spain, 
and Sweden. In contrast, Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands had positive and 
statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficients, at the 1% level.  In Table 8, the FOP panel 
MGE-coefficient was negative, but statistically insignificant. Country wise, Japan had a 
negative and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficient, at the 1% level, while the 
Netherlands had a positive and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficient, at the 1% level. 
Australia had a positive and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficient, at the 5% level.  
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(F)     FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LTAX) 
 
                  In Table 9, the panel FOP MGE-coefficient was negative, but statistically 
insignificant. While Portugal had a negative and statistically significant FOP MGE-
coefficient at the 1% level, both France and the Netherlands had a negative and statistically 
significant FOP MGE-coefficient at the 5% level. On the other hand, only Norway had a 
positive and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficient, at the 1% level, while Greece also 
had a positive related coefficient, and statistically significant at the 5% level. In Table 10, 
only Spain and Denmark had negative and statistically significant FOP MGE-coefficients, at 
the 5% level. On the other hand, Japan had a positive and statistically significant FOP MGE-
coefficient at the 1% level, while the panel FOP MGE-coefficient was positive, although 
insignificant.  
 
    (G)   IMPORT DUTIES AND GOVERNMENT SIZE 
                 In Table 5 the panel TAR MGE-coefficient was positive, but statistically 
insignificant. New Zealand had a negative and statistically significant TAR MGE-coefficient 
at the 1% level, while the Netherlands also had a negative TAR MGE-coefficient, with 
statistical significance at the 5% level. However, Canada, France, and Spain, had positive and 
statistically significant TAR MGE-coefficients at the 1% level, while Korea also had a 
positive Mean Tariff MGE-coefficient, with statistical significance at the 5% level. In Table 
7, the TAR MGE panel coefficient was negative, but not statistically significant. Zimbabwe, 
the US, and Jamaica had negative TAR MGE-coefficients, with statistical significance at the 
5% level. On the other hand, Belgium, Canada, and France had positive TAR MGE-
coefficients, with statistical significance at the 1% level. In Table 9, the TAR MGE panel 
coefficient was positive, but insignificant.  Only Germany had a negative TAR MGE-
coefficient, with statistical significance at the 1% level, while Austria, Ireland, and Zimbabwe 
also had negative TAR MGE-coefficients, with statistical significance at the 5% level. On the 
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other hand, Belgium, France, and Spain had positive TAR MGE-coefficients, with statistical 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
(H)    INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LCON) 
                 In Table 8, the INCAP panel MGE-coefficient was negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Both Sweden and Denmark had negative and statistically 
significant INCAP MGE-coefficients at the 1% level, while France`s was positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. On the whole, “the average effect” of INCAP on CON 
was negative and statistically significant, hence affirming Liberati`s (2007) result that high 
capital mobility may constrain great taxation to finance high spending. 
 
  (I)     OVERALL GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNMENT SIZE (LEXP, LCON, and LTAX) 
                 Apart from Table 8, which exhibits a negative and insignificant Overall 
Globalization panel MGE-coefficient, in all the other Tables (5, 6, 7, 9, and 10) it is positive, 
though also statistically insignificant. Real Income Per Capita, in Tables 7 and 8 had a 
negative and statistically significant panel MGE-coefficient at the 1% level.  
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CONCLUSION 
(A) POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
                 This study employed the Mean Group Estimator to show the average effect of 
overall globalization, including its components such as trade liberalization and financial 
openness, on the size of government. How globalization`s benefits would be maximized, and 
its concomitant costs reduced formed this study`s general policy objective. Overall, 
globalization was shown not to have exerted a significant effect on government size, and 
country specific regressions indicated ambiguity in its direction of association and 
significance. In some countries globalization exerted a significantly positive or negative 
effect on government size; while in other countries it exhibited no such significance. Hence 
country heterogeneity matters, in comprehensively understanding how globalization may 
affect government size, a finding in affirmation of Islam`s (2004) major results.  
                Trade openness showed a negative and significant relationship with government 
consumption, suggesting that it reduces government spending, plausibly by reducing tax 
revenue. Policy wise, trade-tax dependent countries must either precede or institute domestic 
tax system reforms, in conjunction with trade openness if revenue losses are to be adequately 
compensated and trade liberalization supported. Using broad-based domestic consumption 
taxes, plus modernizing tax and customs administration are necessary to bolster public 
revenues (Keen and Ligthart 2002). Indeed any tariff reductions must be linked to zero 
tolerance for corruption, and strongly uncompromising punitive measures against tax evasion. 
The general reduction in mean tariff rates, and various preferential arrangements imply that 
LDCs ought to address domestic constrains precluding their benefit from broader market 
access. Capacity to trade at relatively lower costs must target improving human and 
institutional capacity; plus building, upgrading, and maintaining trade-related infrastructure, 
such as entry points (such as borders, ports, and airports) and ICT network. 
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                 International capital flows were also significantly and negatively related to 
government size, affirming high capital mobility`s capacity to prevent excessive public 
spending. Financial openness and its benefit of risk diversification, underscore the import of 
sound macroeconomic policies and strong legal institutions, because they are incentives that 
pique foreign investors’ interest to hold cross-border securities. The salutary result is that 
prior to committing their funds, investors would insist on an efficient management of the 
economy by government. Therefore, to maximize and sustain globalization`s benefits, as a 
pre-requisite governments ought to be efficient stewards of their economies. 
                 However, the relaxation of regulations pertaining to international capital flows 
may be a recipe for adverse financial and economic situations, if not pursued guardedly.                 
Reining back huge capital out-flows; especially during crisis periods may also be possible if 
the mechanisms for local resource mobilization are harnessed. For example, the issuing of 
bonds denominated in local currencies by government entities and private institutions, within 
developing and emerging economies should gain prominence as a strategic goal, if 
committing the notorious 10”original sin” is to be avoided. 
 
(B) RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH 
                With data paucity almost precluding studies on LDCs, data availability should 
enable future studies to incorporate them, so as to get a catholic picture of how globalization 
affects government size.  
                 Most importantly, globalization`s potential to affect government size is appreciated, 
but its significance varies according to a country`s level of economic, political, and social 
openness. The latter forms of openness determine government`s incentive to spend, and also 
inform investors` decisions to move their capital in search of efficient tax systems. So by and 
large, salutary mobile tax bases may inure governments to efficient and effective spending.  
                                                          
10Committed when countries borrow in foreign currencies, and not in their local currencies, and this due to currency fluctuations, serves to 
increase the risk of defaulting on their debts. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 11: EARLY CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES 
Study Government size measure Number of countries and period Result—summary 
Cameron (1982) Public consumption 19 countries, 1960–79 Negative 
 
Landau (1983) Public expenditure 48 countries, 1961–76 Negative 
 
Marlow (1986) Total expenditure, 
social expenditure 
(both levels and 
growth) 
19 countries, 1960–80 Negative 
 
Saunders (1986) Same as Marlow 
(1986) 
14–21 countries, 
1960–73 and 1975–82 
Previous results sensitive 
to the choice of time 
period and countries 
Saunders (1988) Same as Marlow 
(1986) 
15–17 countries, 
1960–1980 
Previous results sensitive 
to the choice of time 
period and countries 
Agell et al. (1997) Tax and expenditure 
as a share of GDP 
22–23 OECD countries, 
1970–90 
The negative correlation 
not robust to controlling 
for initial GDP and demography 
SOURCE: Andreas Bergh and Magnus Henrekson (2011) 
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TABLE 12: RECENT PANEL DATA STUDIES 
Study Government size 
measure 
Number of 
countries and 
period 
Methodology Conclusion 
Fölster and 
Henrekson 
(2001) 
Total tax revenue, 
total government 
expenditure 
22–29 rich 
countries 
(7 rich non-OECD 
countries used as 
robustness test), 
1970–95. 
 
Fixed effects 
Robust and significant negative effect from 
government expenditure. Less robust negative 
effect for total tax revenue. 
Dar and 
AmirKhalkhali 
(2002) 
Total government 
expenditure 
19 OECD 
countries, 
1971–99. 
Random Effects 
Significant negative effect for the entire period, as 
well as separately for the 1970s and the 1980s. 
For the 1990s separately, no significant effect is 
found. The authors also run country specific 
regressions, finding a 
Significant negative 
Effect for 16 of 19 countries.11 
 
 
Agell et al. 
(2006) 
Total tax revenue, 
total government 
expenditure 
22–23 OECD 
countries, 1970–
95. Fixed effects 
Results in Fölster and Henrekson (2001) are 
weaker when only including OECD countries 
and cannot be given a causal interpretation due to 
simultaneity. 
 
Romero-Avila 
and Strauch 
(2008) 
 
Total and 
disaggregated 
revenue, total and 
disaggregated 
expenditure 
15 EU countries, 
1960–2001, 
annual data. 
Fixed effects 
For total revenue and total expenditure: negative 
and significant effect. Negative and significant for 
direct taxes, insignificant for indirect taxes and 
social security contributions. Negative and 
significant effect from government consumption 
and transfers, significant positive effect from 
government investments. 
 
Colombier 
(2009) 
Total tax revenue, 
total government 
expenditure 
21 OECD 
countries, 
1970–2001. Fixed effects 
Finds ―a stable positive, albeit small, growth 
effect of government size‖ (p. 910); result rebutted 
by Bergh and Öhrn (2011). 
 
 
Afonso and 
Furceri (2010) 
Total public 
revenue and 
expenditure 
28 OECD and EU 
countries, 1970–
2004. Fixed effects 
Both the share and volatility of government 
revenue and spending is detrimental for growth. 
 
 
Bergh and 
Karlsson 
(2010) 
Total public 
revenue and 
expenditure 
24–27 OECD 
countries 1970–
1995, and 1970–
2005. 
Fixed effects 
Negative effect of taxes and 
expenditure robust in a BACE-analysis 
SOURCE: Andreas Bergh and Magnus Henrekson (20110. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11For 3 of 19 countries, the authors report a non-significant relationship: negative but insignificant for Norway and Sweden, positive but 
insignificant for the United States. 
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TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW (GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNMENT SIZE 
AUTHOR PERIOD METHODOLOGY ARGUMENTS RESULTS 
David Cameron 
(1978) 
1960-1975 Performed cross-country 
regressions, comprising 18 
OECD capitalist economies, 
using first-order differences, 
rather than percentage changes. 
 
 Dependent variable is 
Government`s Revenue as a 
share of GDP; and control 
variables include Real GDP, 
Government`s Revenues from 
Indirect Taxes & Social 
Security Contributions, 
Government`s Electoral Base 
composed of Social 
Government`s Revenues 
Received By Central 
Government, Exports & Imports 
of Goods & Services as a 
Percentage of GDP.  
 
 
Governments can dampen 
the effects of the open 
economy on production, 
employment, and 
consumption by increasing 
the scope of the public 
economy (Lindbeck, 1975). 
Nations with open 
economies were far more 
likely to experience an 
increase in the scope of 
public funding, than were 
nations with relatively 
closed economies 
(registered a strong 
coefficient of 0.79). 
Dani Rodrik (1998) 
 
Data are period 
averages for 
1960-64,1965-
69, 1970-
74,1975-
79,1980-
84,1985-89,& 
1990-92 (except 
GDP per capita, 
which pertains to 
the beginning of 
each period). 
Ran Panel regressions (with 
Stata) using both fixed and 
random effects, as well as first 
differences. 
 
Main Dependent Variable is 
Real Government Consumption 
to GDP; besides Social Security 
& Welfare Spending for 
robustness; with Trade 
Openness as the Main predictor. 
 
115 countries initially 
investigated; 68 countries for 
the above robustness test; and 
147 countries sampled to test 
government consumption`s 
stabilization of income 
volatility. 
 
Data are period averages for 
1960-64,1965-69, 1970-
74,1975-79,1980-84,1985-89,& 
1990-92 (except GDP per 
capita, which pertains to the 
beginning of each period). 
Increases in external risk 
engender greater volatility 
in domestic income and 
consumption. 
 
Larger share in GDP of 
government purchases of 
goods & services reduces 
income volatility 
 
 
Risk-mitigating role of 
government spending 
prominently in social 
security & welfare, 
particularly in advanced 
countries with quality 
administrative capability to 
manage income transfers. 
 
Causality runs from 
exposure to external risk to 
government spending. 
There exists a positive 
correlation between an 
economy`s exposure to 
international trade and its 
government`s size. 
 
External risk is positively 
and significantly 
associated with income 
volatility for all three 
measures of income (Real 
GDP adjusted for changes 
in terms of trade, Real 
GDP, and 12Real GDP net 
of government 
consumption) 
 
A small (permanent) 
increase in government 
consumption (as a share of 
GDP) resulted in more 
stable incomes in 119 out 
of 147 countries. 
 
External risk not only 
determines the size of 
government consumption, 
but also its estimated 
coefficient in the high-
income samples (OECD) 
is considerably larger in 
the Social Security And 
Welfare regression, than in 
the Government 
Consumption one. 
 
 
Alberto, Alesina & 
Romain Wacziarg 
(1998) 
1980-1984 and 
1985-1989 
OLS regressions run, with the 
main dependent variable as the 
share of Government 
Consumption in GDP, 
excluding Interest Payments, 
Transfers, and Public 
Investment. Others include 
Government Current 
Expenditure; Public Investment; 
There is a negative 
relationship between 
country size and 
government size, including 
trade openness. 
 
 
 
Univariate regressions of 
various measures of 
government size, on the 
log of population show 
that country size is 
negatively related to the 
share of government 
consumption, the share of 
total government current 
                                                          
12 Private GDP was more responsive to external risk than aggregate GDP, judging by estimated coefficients and 
their significance levels. 
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Government Spending on 
Education; Government 
Spending on Defense; and 
Government Consumption net 
of defense/Education. 
 
Control variables include Trade 
Openness, Population, Total 
GDP, Per Capita Income, the 
Dependency Ratio, 
Urbanization Rate, Population 
Density (Population/Area), 
Democracy Index, Terms of 
Trade Shocks, Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization, Number of 
Revolutions per Year, War 
between 1960 and 1985 
Dummy, Latin America 
Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy, South East Asia 
Dummy, and the OECD 
Dummy. 
 
 
expenditures (including 
transfers and interest 
payments), the share of 
consumption spending 
excluding education and 
defense, and the share of 
education related 
expenditures.  A very 
strong correlation between 
country size and trade 
openness is displayed.   
 
Political instability, wars 
and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization are 
shown to be strong 
determinants of defense 
spending. Similarly, 
urbanization rates seem to 
strongly determine 
government consumption 
and investment. 
 
Using the broadest 
measure of government 
expenditure, comprising 
transfers and interest 
payments, the effect of the 
log of population, was still 
negative. 
Muhammad Q 
Islam (2004) 
1929-1997 Time series data from 6 OECD 
countries (USA, Australia, 
Canada, Norway, England, and 
Sweden). Main dependent 
variable was Government 
Expenditure to GDP Ratio. 
Controls include Real GDP Per 
Capita, Trade Openness, Terms 
of Trade Volatility, and Terms 
of Trade Risk. GARCH was 
used to measure Volatility, 
while the level coefficients were 
estimated using ARDL and FM-
OLS techniques. 
 
 
Co-integration among the 
variables is first checked, then 
the existence of a long-run 
relationship is tested, using the 
bounds test proposed by Pesaran 
et al (PSS, 2001), which is 
applicable as long as the data 
are I(0) or I(1), thus dispensing 
with the need to pretest data for 
the presence of unit roots. 
 
 
Tested whether government 
size increases, in a bid to 
respond to the external risk 
created by greater 
openness, and also affirm 
the existence of a long-run 
relationship between 
openness and government 
size. 
 
ARDL and FM-OLS 
results for the USA are 
consistent across the 
estimation technique and 
lag structure, all showing 
that both GDP and 
openness are significant 
determinants of 
government size. The 
relationship between Per 
Capita GDP and 
Government Size is 
significantly positive, 
while the relationship 
between Government Size 
and Openness is negative. 
Volatility and risk are not 
statistically significant 
determinants of 
Government Size. 
 
 
 
 Data from the USA 
rejects the hypothesis that 
openness results in larger 
Government Size. Further, 
the risk variable is not 
significant, indicating that 
the hypothesized risk 
mitigating mechanism, 
through which trade 
openness affects 
government size, does not 
exist. GDP has a 
significant positive 
relationship with all of the 
remaining countries in the 
sample.  
 
 
 
Only for Australia, 
Government Size was 
positively and 
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significantly related to 
external risk, confirming 
the risk-mitigating 
explanation for the 
observed correlation 
between Government Size 
and Trade Openness. By 
and large, Time series 
analysis does not confirm 
that Government size 
responds to Trade 
Openness. Besides, the 
impact of Trade Volatility 
on Government Size is 
idiosyncratic, and country 
specific heterogeneity may 
be important in 
determining the nature of 
the relationship between 
Government Size, 
Openness, and Volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Benarroch 
and Manish Pandey 
(2007) 
1970-2000 
Sampling 96 countries, panel 
regressions based on the fixed-
effects model, and Granger 
causality tests were performed. 
Government Consumption is the 
dependent variable. Controls 
include one period lagged Trade 
Openness, GDP Per Capita, 
Urbanization, Population, and 
the Dependency Ratio; 
including also lagged Volatility, 
plus the lagged Volatility and 
lagged Openness term. 
 
Does trade openness cause 
higher government 
consumption? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does higher government 
consumption cause higher 
trade openness? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does higher openness cause 
greater volatility, or vice 
versa? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does volatility cause bigger 
governments, or vice versa? 
 
After controlling for the 
effects of lagged first 
differences of government 
consumption and the first 
difference of openness, 
there is no statistically 
significant relationship 
between lagged openness 
and government size. 
 
The coefficient for lagged 
first difference of 
government size is 
negative and significant 
suggesting that higher 
government size causes 
lower openness. 
 
 
No causal relationship 
between trade openness 
and terms of trade 
volatility exists. 
 
 
 
A reverse causality going 
from government size to 
volatility is found, 
suggesting that an increase 
in government size causes 
a decrease in terms of 
trade volatility. 
Paolo Epifani and 
Gino Garcia (2008) 
Period Averages 
for the years 
1995-2000. 5-
year averages 
from 1950-54 
to1990-94. 6-
year averages 
from 1995 to 
2000. 
143 country-cross-sectional 
OLS study, with the main 
dependent variable as general 
government consumption 
expenditure. Predictors include 
Trade Openness, Per Capita 
Income, Population, Polity, 
Black Market Premium, Current 
Openness increases 
government size through 
terms of trade externality, 
whereby trade lowers the 
domestic cost of taxation; 
and through the demand for 
insurance, whereby trade 
raises risk and public 
transfers. 
There is a positive 
association between trade 
openness and government 
size. The latter correlation 
though is contingent upon 
a low elasticity of 
substitution between 
domestic and foreign 
goods. Income is 
negatively correlated with 
government consumption. 
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Account Restriction, Exchange 
Rate Restriction, Capital 
Account Restriction, Export 
Concentration and Regional 
Dummies. 
Fabrizio Carmignani 
& Emilio Colombo 
(2008) 
5-year averages, 
over 1970-2000 A 79 country-panel study, with 
dependent variable as total 
government expenditure. The 
measure of economic volatility 
was the standard deviation of 
aggregate output growth over a 
five-year period. Controls 
include trade openness, the 
international capital flows 
index, an index based on the de 
facto classification of exchange 
rate regimes, population, urban 
population, current account 
balance, and the de facto central 
bank independence, proxied by 
the turnover rate of central bank 
governor.  
Included is the ratio of domestic 
credit from the banking sector to 
GDP, to account for the depth of 
domestic financial markets. The 
Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) system 
estimator is employed, to obtain 
robust estimates of model 
parameters under very general 
assumptions concerning the 
structure of residuals. 
Endogeneity is dealt with 
through Instrumental Variables. 
Output volatility and 
expenditure are jointly 
determined, and that both 
variables respond to 
structural factors such as 
institutions, and the degree 
of trade and financial 
openness of the economy. 
Output volatility increases 
government expenditure, 
but higher expenditure, 
being more volatile, 
causes larger output 
volatility.  Trade openness 
(the first pillar of 
globalization) directly 
increases output volatility, 
and hence indirectly 
causes higher expenditure.  
Financial openness (the 
second pillar of 
globalization) appears 
instead to have a 
disciplining effect on 
government expenditure, 
thus indirectly 
contributing to 
stabilization. Its direct 
effect on output volatility 
is, on the contrary, 
positive, even though this 
result is not robust to all 
specifications. 
 
With respect to political 
institutions, similarly to 
Persson and Tabellini 
(2004), expenditure tends 
to be higher in 
parliamentary systems and 
with proportional electoral 
rules. The institutional 
effect shows that greater 
de facto central bank 
independence lowers 
output volatility, 
contrasting with the 
neutrality result obtained 
by Alesina and Summers 
(1993), but is consistent 
this paper`s other finding 
that government 
expenditure raises growth 
volatility. 
Alena Kimakova 
(2009) 
1976-2003 Government Consumption is 
dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include Gross Capital 
Flows, International Trade, Real 
Does government size 
increase with financial 
integration? 
The Arelano-Bond 
estimator confirms the 
statistical significance and 
robust relationship, 
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GDP Per Capita, Dependency 
Ratio, the Political System, 
Population, and Urban 
Population. 
 
The Arrelano-Bond linear, 
dynamic panel data estimation 
technique is employed for the 
robustness of the panel 
regression for 87 developing 
and developed countries. 
 
Both random and fixed effects 
models were employed and the 
regressions included a time 
trend and/or a dummy variable 
for the 1990s to account for a 
potential structural change 
during this period. 
between government size 
and ﬁnancial openness.  
 
Financial openness 
represented by gross 
private capital ﬂows as 
percentage of GDP is a 
statistically signiﬁcant 
explanatory variable at the 
1% level under all 
specifications. Economies 
with greater exposure to 
cross border capital ﬂows 
tend to have larger 
government size. 
 
 
Higher degrees of age 
dependency and 
urbanization are associated 
with greater government 
size. Real GDP per capita 
has a negative sign and is 
signiﬁcant only in the 
random eﬀects panel 
regression.  
 
 
The expected sign of the 
coeﬃcient on population 
size as a proxy for country 
size is negative due to the 
ﬁxed costs and economies 
of scale associated with 
public goods. 
 
Rati Ram (2009) 1960-2000 154 country-pooled OLS 
regressions and the two-way 
fixed-effects format by 
including country and time 
dummies were employed. Main 
dependent variable is Share of 
Government Consumption in 
GDP. Controls include 
Population, Trade Openness, 
and GDP Per Capita. 
 
 
 
There is a positive co-
variation between a 
country's trade openness 
and the size of its 
government, because larger 
government size is a 
response to the increased 
income risk that greater 
openness usually entails 
(Rodrik, 1998). 
 
There is a negative co-
variation between country 
size and trade openness, 
and also with the share of 
public consumption in 
GDP, which suggests that 
the latter negative 
combinations, may explain 
the positive relation 
between trade openness and 
government size (Alesina 
and Wacziarg (1998). 
 
Using OLS estimates, the 
association between 
government size and 
country size, and that 
between openness and 
country size is negative 
and statistically 
significant. This is true not 
merely in pooled annual 
data, but also for (pooled) 
5-year and 10-year 
averages, and consistency 
across the three 
aggregation levels is 
notable. 
The panel-data fixed-
effects models, which are 
preferred to OLS (and 
random-effects) formats, 
indicate lack of support for 
the Alesina–Wacziarg 
view that the negative 
association of country size 
with government size and 
openness is likely to 
generate the Rodrik-type 
positive association 
between government size 
and openness. Also, every 
coefficient of LPOP is 
positive and statistically 
significant, to the extent 
that the pattern is 
consistent with the fixed-
effects estimates 
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